STATE OF MICHIGAN MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING SYSTEM ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

IN THE MATTER OF:



Reg. No: 15-009317 Issue No: 2010

Hearing Date August 5, 2015 Charlevoix/Emmet

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Landis Y. Lain

HEARING DECISION

Following Claimant's request for a hearing, this matter is before the undersigned Administrative Law Judge pursuant to MCL 400.9 and 400.37; 7 CFR 273.15 to 273.18; 42 CFR 431.200 to 431.250; 45 CFR 99.1 to 99.33; and 45 CFR 205.10. After due notice, a telephone hearing was held on August 5, 2015, from Lansing, Michigan. Claimant was represented at the hearing by Attorney Claimant's appeared to testify at the hearing. Claimant is in Long-term Care daughter. and did not appear to testify at the hearing.

The Department of Health and Human Services was represented by Assistant Attorney General . Participants/Witnesses on behalf of the Department of of Health and Human Services (Department) included Eligibility Specialist.

This hearing was originally heard by Administrative Law Judge Vickie Armstrong. Judge Armstrong is currently on leave from the Michigan Administrative Hearings System. This hearing decision was completed by Administrative Law Judge Landis Y. Lain after listening to the audio hearings record and considering the entire written record.

State's Exhibit pages 1-42 were admitted as evidence without objection.

ISSUE

Did the Department of Human Services (the department or DHS) properly determine that claimant had a divestment penalty?

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Administrative Law Judge, based upon the competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record, finds as material fact:

- 1. On April 24, 2014, Claimant entered Long Term Care.
- 2. On May 2, 2014, Claimant's representative filed an application for Medical Assistance benefits.
- 3. May 23, 2014, another Medical Assistance application was submitted on Claimant's behalf.
- 4. On June 4, 2014, the Department sent claimant a Health Care Coverage Determination, approving claimant's request for Medicaid with a divestment period of seven months eleven days.
- 5. On June 9, 2014, and on June 11, 2014, Claimant's representative filed a request for a hearing to contest the department's assessment of a divestment penalty.
- 6. On October 7, 2014, Administrative Law Judge Gary Heisler affirmed the Department's assessment of a Divestment penalty.
- 7. The decision was not appealed.
- 8. Claimant was private pay for a period of time.
- 9. On April 8, 2015, Claimant filed an application for MA-LTC with retroactive application for January, February and March 2015.
- 10. Claimant submitted bank statements for all months January through May 2015, as well as verification of vehicle sold, patient trust account at nursing home and burial assets.
- 11. The Department caseworker determined that Claimant was over the asset limit of \$2000.00 for January 2015 based on the checking account at low balance \$ less pension income; and savings account # low balance January \$ less \$ Social Security income, patient trust account low balance \$ Council Assets balance for January 2015 of \$
- 12. The Department caseworker determined that Claimant was over the asset limit of \$2000.00 for February 2015 based upon Low balance Account # State less pension \$ Patient Trust Account low balance \$ Savings account # State less \$ Social Security income. (Total Assets balance for February 2015 \$ Social Security income.
- 13. Claimant was approved for Medicaid for March 2015, but was required to serve the prior divestment penalty from March 1, 2015 to

October 11, 2015 for funds given away previously and the assessed divestment penalty.

- 14. On May 26, 2015, the Department caseworker sent Claimant's representative a benefit Notice stating that Medicaid would not pay for long-term care home/community-based services from March 1, 2015 to October 11, 2015, because Claimant or spouse gave away assets or income for less than their value. Department Exhibit 31.
- 15. On June 1, 2015, Claimant's representative filed a request for hearing to contest the department's negative action, stating that services should relate back to December 1, 2014. Applicant has had no assets since November 15, 2014. All "divested" assets have been utilized for patient's long term care.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The regulations governing the hearing and appeal process for applicants and recipients of public assistance in Michigan are found in the Michigan Administrative Code, MAC R 400.901-400.951. An opportunity for a hearing shall be granted to an applicant who requests a hearing because his or her claim for assistance has been denied. MAC R 400.903(1). Clients have the right to contest a department decision affecting eligibility or benefit levels whenever it is believed that the decision is incorrect. The department will provide an administrative hearing to review the decision and determine the appropriateness of that decision. BAM 600.

The Medical Assistance (MA) program is established by Title XIX of the Social Security Act and is implemented by Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR). The Department of Human Services (DHS or department) administers the MA program pursuant to MCL 400.10, *et seq.*, and MCL 400.105. Department policies are found in the Program Administrative Manual (BAM), the Program Eligibility Manual (BEM) and the Program Reference Manual (PRM).

Title XIX of the Social Security Act, commonly referred to as "The Medicaid Act," provides for medical assistance services to individuals <u>who lack the financial means</u> to obtain needed health care. 42 U.S.C. §1396. (Emphasis added)

The Medicaid program is administered by the federal government through the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The state and federal governments share financial responsibility for Medicaid services. Each state may choose whether or not to participate in the Medicaid program. Once a state chooses to participate, it must operate its Medicaid program in accordance with mandatory federal requirements, imposed both by the Medicaid Act and by implementing federal regulations authorized under the Medicaid Act and promulgated by HHS. Participating states must provide at least seven categories of medical services to persons determined to be eligible Medicaid recipients. 42 USC \$1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17), (21). One of the seven mandated services is *nursing facility services*. 42 USC \$1396d(a)(4)(A).

For medical assistance eligibility, the Department has defined an asset as "any kind of property or property interest, whether real, personal, or mixed, whether liquid or illiquid, and whether or not presently vested with possessory rights." NDAC 75-02-02.1-01(3). Under both federal and state law, an asset must be "actually available" to an applicant to be considered a countable asset for determining medical assistance eligibility. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 237 (On Petition for Rehearing); Hinschberger v. Griggs County Social Serv., 499 N.W.2d 876, 882 (N.D.1993); 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B); 1 J. Krauskopf, R. Brown, K. Tokarz, and A. Bogutz, Elderlaw: Advocacy for the Aging § 11.25 (2d ed. 1993). Yet, "actually available" resources "are different from those in hand." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 48, 101 S.Ct. 2633, 2642, 69 L.Ed.2d 460 (1981) (emphasis in original). NDAC 75-02-02.1-25(2) explains: Only such assets as are actually available will be considered. Assets are actually available when at the disposal of an applicant, recipient, or responsible relative; when the applicant, recipient, or responsible relative has a legal interest in a liquidated sum and has the legal ability to make the sum available for support, maintenance, or medical care; or when the applicant, recipient, or responsible relative has the lawful power to make the asset available, or to cause the asset to be made available. Assets will be reasonably evaluated.... See also45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D).

As noted in *Hecker*, if an applicant has a legal ability to obtain an asset, it is considered an "actually available" resource. The actual-availability principle primarily serves "to prevent the States from conjuring fictional sources of income and resources by imputing financial support from persons who have no obligation to furnish it or by overvaluing assets in a manner that attributes non-existent resources to recipients." *Heckler v. Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 200, 105 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 84 L.Ed.2d 138 (1985).*

The focus is on an applicant's actual and practical ability to make an asset available as a matter of fact, not legal fiction. *See Schrader v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare,* 768 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.1985). *See also Lewis v. Martin,* 397 U.S. 552, 90 S.Ct. 1282, 25 L.Ed.2d 561 (1970) (invalidating California state regulation that presumed contribution of non-AFDC resources by a non-legally responsible and non-adoptive stepfather or common law husband of an AFDC recipient's mother).

Determining whether an asset is "actually available" for purposes of medical assistance eligibility is largely a fact-specific inquiry depending on the circumstances of each case. See, e.g., Intermountain Health Care v. Bd. of Cty. Com'rs, 107 Idaho 248, 688 P.2d 260, 264 (Ct.App.1984); Radano v. Blum, 89 A.D.2d 858, 453 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1982); Haynes v. Dept. of Human Resources, 121 N.C.App. 513, 470 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1996). Interpretation of the "actually available" requirement must be "reasonable and humane in accordance with its manifest intent and purpose…" Moffett v. Blum, 74 A.D.2d 625, 424 N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (1980). That an applicant must sue to collect an asset the

applicant has a legal entitlement to usually does not mean the asset is actually unavailable. See, e.g., Wagner v. Sheridan County S.S. Bd., 518 N.W.2d 724, 728 (N.D.1994); Frerks v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 412, 414 (2d Cir.1995); Probate of Marcus, 199 Conn. 524, 509 A.2d 1, 5 (1986); Herman v. Ramsey Cty. Community Human Serv., 373 N.W.2d 345, 348 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). See also Ziegler v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv., 601 So.2d 1280, 1284 (Fla.Ct.App.1992) At issue here is the methodology utilized in determining the availability of an individual's "resources" for purposes of evaluating his or her eligibility. SSI recipients, and thus SSI-related "medically needy" recipients, may not retain resources having a value in excess of \$2,000. 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1)(B).

The regulations governing the determination of eligibility provide that resources mean cash or other liquid assets or any real or personal property that an individual (or spouse, if any) owns and could convert to cash to be used for his support and maintenance. If the individual has the right, authority or power to liquidate the property, or his share of the property, it is considered a resource. If a property right cannot be liquidated, the property will not be considered a resource of the individual (or spouse).20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a).

After the Medicaid program was enacted, a field of legal counseling arose involving asset protection for future disability. The practice of "Medicaid Estate Planning," whereby "individuals shelter or divest their assets to qualify for Medicaid without first depleting their life savings," is a legal practice that involves utilization of the complex rules of Medicaid eligibility, arguably comparable to the way one uses the Internal Revenue Code to his or her advantage in preparing taxes. See generally Kristin A. Reich, Note, Long-Term Care Financing Crisis-Recent Federal and State Efforts to Deter Asset Transfers as a Means to Gain Medicaid Eligibility, 74 N.D. L.Rev. 383 (1998). Serious concern then arose over the widespread divestiture of assets by mostly wealthy individuals so that those persons could become eligible for Medicaid benefits. Id.; see also Rainey v. Guardianship of Mackey, 773 So.2d 118 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). As a result, Congress enacted several laws to discourage the transfer of assets for Medicaid qualification purposes. See generally Laura Herpers Zeman. Estate Planning: Ethical Considerations of Using Medicaid to Plan for Long-Term Medical Care for the Elderly, 13 Quinnipiac Prob. L.J. 187 (1988). Recent attempts by Congress imposed periods of ineligibility for certain Medicaid benefits where the applicant divested himself or herself of assets for less than fair market value. 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B)(i); Fla. Admin. Code R. 65A-1.712(3). More specifically, if a transfer of assets for less than fair market value is found within 36 months of an individual's application for Medicaid, the state must withhold payment for various long-term care services, i.e., payment for nursing home room and board, for a period of time referred to as the penalty period. Fla. Admin. Code R. 65A-1.712(3). Medicaid does not, however, prohibit eligibility altogether. It merely penalizes the asset transfer for a certain period of time. See generally Omar N. Ahmad, Medicaid Eligibility Rules for the Elderly Long-Term Care Applicant, 20 J. Legal Med. 251 (1999). [Thompson v. Dep't of Children & Families, 835 So.2d 357, 359-360 (Fla App, 2003).]

In *Gillmore* the Illinois Supreme Court recognized this same history, noting that over the years (and particularly in 1993), Congress enacted certain measures to prevent persons who were not actually "needy" from making themselves eligible for Medicaid:

In 1993, Congress sought to combat the rapidly increasing costs of Medicaid by enacting statutory provisions to ensure that persons who could pay for their own care did not receive assistance. Congress mandated that, in determining Medicaid eligibility, a state must "look-back" into a three- or five-year period, depending on the asset, before a person applied for assistance to determine if the person made any transfers solely to become eligible for Medicaid. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396p(c)(1)(B) (2000). If the person disposed of assets for less than fair market value during the look-back period, the person is ineligible for medical assistance for a statutory penalty period based on the value of the assets transferred. See 42 U.S.C.§ 1396p(c)(1)(A) (2000). [Gillmore, 218 III 2d at 306 (emphasis added).]

See, also, *ES* v. *Div. of Med. Assistance and Health Servs.*, *412 NJ Super 340, 344; 990 A.2d 701 (2010)* (Noting that the purpose of this close scrutiny while "looking back" is "to determine if [the asset transfers] were made for the sole purpose of Medicaid qualification.").

This statutory "look-back" period, noted in *Gillmore* and *Thompson* and contained within 42 USC 1396p(c)(1), requires a state to "look-back" a number of years (in this case five) from the date of an asset transfer to determine if the applicant made the transfer solely to become eligible for Medicaid, which can be established if the transfer was made for less than fair market value. See 42 USC 1396p(c)(1); DHS Program Eligibility Manual (PEM) 405, pp 1, 4; see also *Gillmore*, 218 III 2d at 306.

"Less than fair market value means the compensation received in return for a resource was worth less than the fair market value of the resource." BEM 405, p 5.

A transfer for less than fair market value during the "look-back" period is referred to as a "divestment," and unless falling under one of several exclusions, subjects the applicant to a penalty period during which payment of long-term care benefits is suspended. See, generally BEM 405, pp 1, 5-9. "Congress's imposition of a penalty for the disposal of assets or income for less than fair market value during the look-back period is intended to maximize the resources for Medicaid for those truly in need." *ES*, 412 NJ Super at 344. See also *Mackey v Department of Human Services, Michigan Court of Appeals, Docket No. 288966, decided September 7, 2010.*

Pertinent department policy dictates:

Assets must be considered in determining eligibility or SSI related categories. Assets mean cash, any other personal property and real property. (BEM, Item 400 Page 1). Countable assets cannot exceed the applicable asset limit. Not all assets are counted. Some assets are counted for one program but not for another program. (BEM Item 400, Page 1).

The department is to consider both of the following to determine whether and how much of an asset is countable: An asset is countable if it meets the availability test and is not excluded. The department is to consider the assets of each person in the asset group. (BEM, Item 400, Page 1).

Asset eligibility exists when the asset groups countable assets are less than or equal to the applicable asset limit at least one day during the month being tested. (BEM, Item 400, Page 4). An application does not authorize MA for future months if the person has excess assets on the processing date.

The SSI related MA asset limit for SSI related MA categories that are not medicare savings program or QDWI is \$2000.00 for an asset group for one person and \$3000.00 for an asset group of 2 people. BEM, Item 400 Page 5.

An asset must be available to be counted. Available means that someone in the asset group has the legal right to use or dispose of the asset. BEM, Item 400, Page 6. The department is to assume an asset is available unless the evidence shows that it is not available.

BEM, Item 405, states:

Divestment results in a penalty period in MA, **not** ineligibility. Divestment is a type of transfer of a resource and not an amount of resources transferred.

Divestment means a transfer of a resource (see RESOURCE DEFINED below and in glossary) by a client or his spouse that are all of the following:

- Is within a specified time; see LOOK-BACK PERIOD in this item.
- Is a transfer for LESS THAN FAIR MARKET VALUE;
- Is not listed below under TRANSFERS THAT ARE NOT DIVESTMENT

See Annuity Not Actuarially Sound and Joint Owners and Transfers below and BEM 401 about special transactions considered transfers for less than fair market value.

During the penalty period, MA will **not** pay the client's cost for:

- LTC services.
- Home and community-based services.
- Home Help.
- Home Health. BEM, Item 405, page 1

Resource means all the client's and his spouse's assets and income. It includes all assets and all income, even countable and/or excluded assets, the individual or spouse receive. It also includes all assets and income that the individual (or their spouse) were entitled to but did **not** receive because of action by one of the following:

- The client or spouse.
- A person (including a court or administrative body) with legal authority to act in place of or on behalf of the client or the client's spouse.

• Any person (including a court or administrative body) acting at the direction or upon the request of the client or his spouse. BEM, Item 405, page 2

Transferring a resource means giving up all or partial ownership in (or rights to) a resource. Not all transfers are divestment. Examples of transfers include:

- Selling an asset for fair market value (not divestment).
- Giving an asset away (divestment).
- Refusing an inheritance (divestment).
- Payments from a **MEDICAID TRUST** that are **not** to, or for the benefit of, the person or his spouse; see BEM 401 (divestment).
- Putting assets or income in a trust; see BEM 401.
- Giving up the **right** to receive income such as having pension payments made to someone else (divestment).
- Giving away a lump sum or accumulated benefit (divestment).
- Buying an annuity that is **not** actuarially sound (divestment).
- Giving away a vehicle (divestment).
- Putting assets or income into a Limited Liability Company (LLC)BEM, item 405, page 2

Department policy states that it is **not** divestment to transfer a homestead to the client's:

- Spouse; see Transfers Involving Spouse above.
- Blind or disabled child; see Transfers Involving Child above.
- Child under age 21.
- Child age 21 or over who:
 - Lived in the homestead for at least two years immediately before the client's admission to LTC or BEM 106 waiver approval, **and**
 - Provided care that would otherwise have required LTC or BEM 106 waiver services, as documented by a physician's (M.D. or D.O.) statement. BEM Item 405, page 8.

Policy also states that the uncompensated value of a divested resource is

- The resource's cash or equity value.
- Minus any compensation received.

• The uncompensated value of a promissory note, loan, or mortgage is the outstanding balance due on the "Baseline Date" BEM, Item 405, page 12.

When divestment occurs the department must invoke a penalty period. The transferred amount is used to calculate the penalty period. The Department may only recalculate the penalty period under certain circumstances. Pertinent policy dictates that the first step in determining the period of time that transfers can be looked at for divestment is determining the baseline date. Once the baseline date is established, you determine the look-back period. The look back period is 60 months prior to the baseline date for all transfers made after February 8, 2006. BEM, Item 405, page 2-4.

The department is allowed to recalculate the penalty period if either of the following occurs while the penalty is in effect:

- All the transferred resources are returned.
- Full compensation is paid for the resources.

Use the same per diem rate originally used to calculate the penalty period.

Once a divestment penalty is in effect, return of, or payment for, resources <u>cannot</u> eliminate any portion of the penalty period already past. However, the caseworker must recalculate the penalty period. The divestment penalty ends on the later of the following:

- The end date of the new penalty period.
- The date the client notified you that the resources were returned or paid for. BEM, Item 405, pages 12-13

Claimant's position is that the divestment occurred because claimant's daughter improperly accessed Claimant's accounts.

The department's position is that the divestment penalty may only be cancelled if "all the transferred (given away) resources are returned and retained by the individual" or "fair market value" is paid for the resources. The penalty period may only be recalculated if "all of the transferred resources are returned", or "full compensation is paid for the resource." PEM, Item 405, page 12.

This Administrative Law Judge finds that the department policy is explicit. It states that all the transferred resources must be returned, or fair market value must be paid for the resources, or full compensation paid for the resources, before the necessity for either cancellation or recalculation of the divestment period can be triggered. There is not an arm's length transaction when the alleged misconduct involves a client's daughter. Policy dictates that an arm's length transaction is one between two parties who are not related and who are assumed to have roughly the same bargaining power. By definition, a transaction between two relatives is not an arm length transaction. (Bridges Policy Glossary (BPG)), page 25.

The documents in the file indicate that the determination that there was divestment has already been made by ALJ Heisler (Register # 14-004880). Thus, the issue is *res judicata*. The divestment penalty must stand and was properly imposed. Claimant divested assets that must be counted for claimant under Medical Assistance policy. Assets that are transferred between spouses are not divestment. However, divestment occurs when one or the other spouse transfers assets to a third party. There has been divestment in this case.

Claimants' representative's statements on the record are not sufficient to rebut the Department's determination that divestment occurred. The Department's determination that claimant's penalty period must remain at seventeen months and sixteen days is correct under the circumstances. The Department has established by the necessary competent, substantial and material evidence on the record that it was acting in accordance with Department policy when it calculated and instituted the divestment penalty under the circumstances. The Department has also properly determined that Claimant was ineligible for Medical Assistance for the Months of January and February 2015, based upon the fact that claimant possessed in excess of \$2000.00 in countable, available assets for those months.

DECISION AND ORDER

The Administrative Law Judge, based upon the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, decides that the Department of Health and Human Services has established by a preponderance of evidence that there has been asset divestment, and properly determined that a divestment penalty period should be instituted from March 1 through October 11, 2015 under the circumstances. The Department also properly determined that Claimant had in excess of \$2000 in countable, available assets for the months of January and February 2015.

Accordingly, the Department's decision is **AFFIRMED**.

Kandis Y Lain

Landis Y. Lain Administrative Law Judge for Nick Lyon, Director Department of Health and Human Services

Date Signed: August 27, 2015

Date Mailed: August 27, 2015

NOTICE: Administrative Hearings may order a rehearing or reconsideration on either its own motion or at the request of a party within 30 days of the mailing date of this Decision and Order. Administrative Hearings will not order a rehearing or reconsideration on the Department's motion where the final decision cannot be implemented within 90 days of the filing of the original request.

The Claimant may appeal the Decision and Order to Circuit Court within 30 days of the mailing of the Decision and Order or, if a timely request for rehearing was made, within 30 days of the receipt date of the rehearing decision.

Claimant may request a rehearing or reconsideration for the following reasons:

- A rehearing <u>MAY</u> be granted if there is newly discovered evidence that could affect the outcome of the original hearing decision.
- A reconsideration MAY be granted for any of the following reasons:
- misapplication of manual policy or law in the hearing decision,
- typographical errors, mathematical error, or other obvious errors in the hearing decision that effect the substantial rights of the claimant;
- the failure of the ALJ to address other relevant issues in the hearing decision

Request must be submitted through the local DHS office or directly to MAHS by mail at Michigan Administrative Hearings Reconsideration/Rehearing Request P.O. Box 30639 Lansing, Michigan 48909-07322

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