STATE OF MICHIGAN MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING SYSTEM ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

IN THE MATTER OF:				
	Reg. No.: Issue No.: Case No.: Hearing Date: County:	201412094 3005 March 19, 2014 Wayne (31)		
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Robert J. Chavez				
	DECISION FOR ROGRAM VIOLATION			
This matter is before the undersigned Administrative Law Judge pursuant to MCL 400.9 and MCL 400.37 upon the Department of Human Services' (Department) request for a hearing. After due notice, a telephone hearing was held on March 19, 2014 from Detroit, Michigan. The Department was represented by Agent of the Office of Inspector General (OIG).				
Respondent did not appear at the her pursuant to 7 CFR 273.16(e), Mich Adm 400.3187(5).				
<u> </u>	<u>SSUES</u>			
1. Did Respondent receive an overissua	nce (OI) of			
☐ Family Independence Program (Fine Medical Assistance Program (MA)	P) September 1	Program (FAP)		
benefits that the Department is entitle	d to recoup?			
2. Did Respondent commit an Intentiona	Program Violation (IPV)?			

☐ Family Independence Program (FIP) ☐ Food Assistance Program (FAP)

3. Should Respondent be disqualified from receiving

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Administrative Law Judge, based on the competent, material, and substantial evidence on the whole record, finds as material fact:

1.	The Department's OIG filed a hearing request on November 4, 2013 to establish an OI of benefits received by Respondent as a result of Respondent having trafficked program benefits and, as such, allegedly committed an IPV.
2.	The OIG \boxtimes has \square has not requested that Respondent be disqualified from receiving program benefits for a period of one year.
3.	Respondent was a recipient of \boxtimes FAP \square FIP \square MA benefits during the period of November 1, 2011 through August 31, 2011, the fraud period in question.
4.	During the alleged fraud period, Respondent was issued in \boxtimes FAP \square FIP \square MA benefits that the Department alleges was trafficked.
5.	This was Respondent's ⊠ first ☐ second ☐ third alleged IPV.
6.	A notice of hearing was mailed to Respondent at the last known address and \square was \boxtimes was not returned by the US Post Office as undeliverable.
	CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
	epartment policies are contained in the Bridges Administrative Manual (BAM), the idges Eligibility Manual (BEM), and the Reference Tables Manual (RFT).
pro im Re Ag	The Food Assistance Program (FAP) [formerly known as the Food Stamp (FS) ogram] is established by the Food Stamp Act of 1977, as amended, and is plemented by the federal regulations contained in Title 7 of the Code of Federal egulations (CFR). The Department (formerly known as the Family Independence lency) administers FAP pursuant to MCL 400.10, <i>et seq.</i> , and 1999 AC, Rule 0.3001 through Rule 400.3015.

When a client group receives more benefits than they are entitled to receive, DHS must attempt to recoup the OI. BAM 700, p. 1.

Suspected IPV means an OI exists for which all three of the following conditions exist:

- The client intentionally failed to report information or intentionally gave incomplete or inaccurate information needed to make a correct benefit determination, and
- The client was clearly and correctly instructed regarding his or her reporting responsibilities, and

 The client has no apparent physical or mental impairment that limits his or her understanding or ability to fulfill their reporting responsibilities.

BAM 700 (2013), p. 6; BAM 720, p. 1.

An IPV is also suspected for a client who is alleged to have trafficked FAP benefits. BAM 720, p. 1.

An IPV requires that the Department establish by clear and convincing evidence that the client has intentionally withheld or misrepresented information for the **purpose** of establishing, maintaining, increasing or preventing reduction of program benefits or eligibility. BAM 720, p. 1 (emphasis in original); see also 7 CFR 273(e)(6). Clear and convincing evidence is evidence sufficient to result in a clear and firm belief that the proposition is true. See M Civ JI 8.01.

The federal Food Stamp regulations read in part:

- (c) Definition of Intentional Program Violation. Intentional Program Violation shall consist of having intentionally:
- (1) made a false or misleading statement, or misrepresented, concealed or withheld facts; or
- (2) committed any act that constitutes a violation of the Food Stamp Act, the Food Stamp Program Regulations, or any State statute for the purpose of using, presenting, transferring, acquiring, receiving, possessing or trafficking of coupons, authorization cards or reusable documents used as part of an automated benefit delivery system (access device). 7 CFR 273.16(c).
 - (6) Criteria for determining intentional program violation. The hearing authority shall base the determination of intentional program violation on clear and convincing evidence which demonstrates that the household member(s) committed, and intended to commit, intentional program violation as defined in paragraph (c) of this section. 7 CFR 273.16(c)(6).

The Department's OIG requests IPV hearings for cases when:

- benefit overissuance are not forwarded to the prosecutor.
- prosecution of welfare fraud is declined by the prosecutor for a reason other than lack of evidence, and
- the total overissuance amount is \$1000 or more, or
- the total overissuance amount is less than \$1000, and
 - the group has a previous intentional program violation, or
 - the alleged IPV involves FAP trafficking, or
 - the alleged fraud involves concurrent receipt of assistance.
 - the alleged fraud is committed by a state/government employee.

BAM 720 (2013), p. 12.

A court or hearing decision that finds a client committed IPV disqualifies that client from receiving program benefits. A disqualified recipient remains a member of an active group as long as he lives with them. Other eligible group members may continue to receive benefits. BAM 720, p. 12.

Clients who commit an IPV are disqualified for a standard disqualification period except when a court orders a different period, or except when the overissuance relates to MA. BAM 720, p. 13. Refusal to repay will not cause denial of current or future MA if the client is otherwise eligible. BAM 710 (2013), p. 2. Clients are disqualified for periods of one year for the first IPV, two years for the second IPV, lifetime disqualification for the third IPV, and ten years for a concurrent receipt of benefits. BAM 720, p. 16.

Therefore, the undersigned may only find an IPV if there is clear and convincing evidence that Respondent intentionally made a false or misleading statement, or intentionally withheld information with the intention to commit an IPV with regard to the FAP program. Thus, the Department must not only prove that Respondent committed an act, but that there was intent to commit the act.

In the current case, the Administrative Law Judge is not convinced that the Department has met its burden of proof in providing clear and convincing evidence that Respondent trafficked their FAP benefits.

First, the undersigned notes that intentionality is a specific requirement under the Code of Federal Regulations. The Code of Federal Regulations makes no distinction as to whether the IPV at hand be for a failure to report information or FAP trafficking; a clear and convincing show of intentionality is required. Therefore, it is possible to unintentionally traffic FAP benefits; in such a situation, a finding of IPV would be inappropriate.

Additionally, it should be noted that the burden of proof that the Department must meet in order to prove IPV is very high. It is not enough to prove that Respondent more than likely trafficked or that there was FAP trafficking occurring at the store in question. The Department must prove in a clear and convincing manner that Respondent trafficked their benefits.

In other words, the Department must show through clear and convincing evidence that Respondent intentionally committed an act in order to traffic their FAP benefits.

The Department has failed to prove that claimant intentionally trafficked their FAP benefits.

First, the undersigned must note that the actions of the store are not at issue in the current case and the store in question is not the subject of this administrative hearing; while there is clear evidence, including confessions that the store in question engaged in the trafficking of FAP benefits, the bad actions of one party cannot be used to infer guilt on a separate, distinct, party.

The Department's case relies on three key pieces of evidence: that the store in question admitted to trafficking FAP benefits; that the store in question had very little actual food stock, and; that Respondent shopped at that store and had purchasing patterns that were, in the experience of the investigating agent, consistent with FAP trafficking.

With regard to the store itself, the undersigned is prepared to say that the Department showed clearly and convincingly that the store trafficked FAP benefits. The evidence presented painted a clear picture of FAP trafficking, and testified credibly that the USDA permanently disqualified the store from participating in the FAP program because it trafficked benefits.

Unfortunately, the store is not the respondent in the current case.

In the current case, with this Respondent, the Department has only proven that Respondent shopped at the store in question. While it is true that the store only carried limited food goods, limited food goods does not equal zero food goods. The undersigned cannot find that merely shopping at a store that was an FAP trafficker constitutes actual trafficking, especially considering that the store in question did offer goods that could be purchased with FAP benefits. Furthermore, the Department was unable to define or prove exactly what constituted a limited selection of food goods; when asked, the Department could not definitively state how much in food goods were capable of being purchased at one time with FAP benefits.

Mere association is not clear and convincing evidence of malfeasance.

Make no mistake—the undersigned believes that, based on the trafficking patterns identified by the investigating agent, Respondent most likely trafficked FAP benefits,

given the high single transaction amounts present. However, most likely is a threshold far below clear and convincing, and the undersigned cannot hold a respondent guilty of an IPV for benefit trafficking on a probable occurrence. Trafficking patterns only raises the specter of trafficking and does not establish clear and convincing evidence of trafficking in and of itself.

The evidence in this case only shows that the store in question trafficked FAP benefits, and Respondent shopped at that store—nothing more. Without some sort of affirmative evidence that Respondent engaged in trafficking, no IPV can be found. The patterns identified by the investigating agent of the amounts spent at the store only raise the specter of trafficking and do nothing to actually show trafficking occurred.

Whether or not the respondent committed a trafficking offense is, at most, probable. Though the store in question has been permanently banned from participation in the FAP program for trafficking, the determination is not particularly relevant to the immediate question. IPV most definitely cannot be found for associating with an accused trafficker.

The Administrative Law Judge, therefore, cannot say that the Department has proven their case by clear and convincing evidence and declines to find an IPV.

Furthermore, the undersigned cannot hold that the benefits sought to be recouped in this case, were used for trafficking, as there is no evidence beyond the stated trafficking patterns, discussed above. As such, any recoupment in this case must be denied.

DECISION AND ORDER

The Administrative Law Judge, based upon the above Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and for the reasons stated on the record, concludes that:

1.	Respondent did did not commit an IPV.
2.	Respondent \square did \boxtimes did not receive an OI of program benefits in the amount of from the following program(s) \boxtimes FAP \square FIP \square MA.
	The Department is ORDERED to delete the OI and cease any recoupment action.

Administrative Law Judge for Maura Corrigan, Director Department of Human Services

2014-12094/RJC

Date Signed: April 15, 2014

Date Mailed: April 15, 2014

NOTICE: The law provides that within 30 days of receipt of the above Decision and Order, the Respondent may appeal it to the circuit court for the county in which he/she lives.

RJC/tm

