STATE OF MICHIGAN MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING SYSTEM ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

IN THE MATTER OF:



Reg. No.: Issue No.: Case No.: Hearing Date: County: 2013-36259 2009; 4031

July 25, 2013 Ingham

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Vicki L. Armstrong

HEARING DECISION

This matter is before the undersigned Administrative Law Ju dge upon Claimant's chigan Compiled Laws 400.9 and 400.37, nd appeal process. After due notice, a 25, 2013, from Lansing, Michigan. Claimant personally appeared and testified. Participants on behalf of the Department of Human Services (Department) included Lead Worker

ISSUE

Whether the Department of Human Serv ices (the department) properly denied Claimant's application for Medical Ass istance (MA-P), Retro-MA and State Dis ability Assistance (SDA)?

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Administrative Law Judge, based upon the competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record, finds as material fact:

- (1) On September 12, 2012, Claimant filed an application for MA-P, Retro-MA and SDA benefits alleging disability.
 - (2) On February 7, 2013, the Medica I Review Team (MRT) denied Claimant's application for MA-P and Retro-MA i ndicating that she was capable of performing other work based on her non- exertional impairment. SDA was denied due to lack of duration. (Depart Ex. A, pp 1-2).
 - (3) On February 14, 2013, the depar tment caseworker s ent Claimant notice that her application was denied.
 - (4) On March 21, 2013, Claimant filed a request for a hearing to contest the department's negative action.

- (5) On June 7, 2013, the State Hearing Review Team (SHRT) found Claimant was not disabled and retained the capacity to perform simple and repetitive tasks. (Depart Ex B, pp 1-2).
- (6) Claimant has a histor y of recurrent urine tract infections, chronic pelvic pain, anxiety, depression and obsessive compulsive disorder.
- (7) Claimant is a 31 year old woma n whose birthday is Claimant is 5'6" tall and weighs 220 Ibs. Claimant completed a h igh school equivalent education and some college.
- (8) Claimant was appealing the denial of Social Securi ty disability benefits at the time of the hearing.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Medical Assistance (MA) program is established by Subchapter XIX of Chapter 7 of The Public Health & Welfare Act, 42 USC 1397, and is administered by the Department, (DHS or department), pursuant to MCL 400.10 *et seq.* and MCL 400.105. Department policies are found in the Bridges Adminis trative Manual (BAM), the Bridges Eligibilit y Manual (BEM), and the Reference Tables Manual (RFT).

The State Disability A ssistance (SDA) program which provides financial assistance for disabled persons is established by 2004 PA 344. The Department of Human Service s (DHS or department) admin isters the SDA program pursuant to MCL 400.10, *et seq.*, and Mich Admin Code, Rules 400.3151-400.3180. Department policies are found in the Bridges Administrative Manual (BAM), th *e* Bridges Eligibilit y Manual (BEM) and the Reference Tables Manual (RFT).

Current legislative amendments to the Act delineate eligibility criteria as implemented by department policy set forth in program manuals. 2004 PA 344, Sec. 604, es tablishes the State Disability Assistance program. It reads in part:

Sec. 604 (1). The department sha II operate a state di sability assistance program. Except as provided in subsection (3), persons eligible for this program shall includ e needy citizens of the United States or aliens exempt from the Supplemental Security Income citizenship re quirement who are at least 18 years of age or emanc ipated minors meeting one or more of the following requirements:

(b) A per son with a physical or mental impairment whic h meets federal SSI disab ility standards, exce pt that the minimum duration of the dis ability shall be 90 days. Substance abuse alone is not defined as a basis for eligibility.

Specifically, this Act provides minimal cash assistance to individuals with some type of severe, temporary disability which prevents him or her from engaging in substantial gainful work activity for at least ninety (90) days.

Disability is defined as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental im pairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expect ed to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 20 CFR 416.905(a). The person claiming a physical or mental disability has the burden to esta blish it through the use of competent medical evidence from qualified medical sources such as his or her medical history, clinica l/laboratory findings, diagnosis/prescri bed treatment, prognosis for recovery and/or medical assessment of ability to do work-related ac tivities o r ability to reason and make appropriate mental adjustments, if a mental disability is alleged. 20 CRF 413.913. An individual's subjective pain com plaints ar e not, in and of themselves, sufficient to establish disab ility. 20 CF R 416.908; 2 0 CFR 4 16.929(a). Similarly, conclusor y statements by a physician or mental health professional that an individual is disabled or blind, absent supporting medical evidence, is insufficient to establish disability. 20 CFR 416.927.

When determining disability, t he federal regulations require several factors to be considered including: (1) the location/ duration/frequency/intensity of an applicant's pain; (2) the type/dosage/effectiveness/side effects of any medication the applicant nt takes to relieve pain; (3) any treatment other than pain medication that the applicant has received to relieve pain; and, (4) the effect of the applicant's pain on his or her ability to do basic work activities. 20 CFR 416.929(c)(3). The applicant's pain must be assessed to determine the ext ent of his or her function on al limitation(s) in light of the objective medical evidence presented. 20 CFR 416.929(c)(2).

In order to determine whether or not an individual is disabled, federal regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation process be utilized. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(1). The fivestep analysis requires the trier of fact to cons ider an individual's current work activit y; the severity of the impairment(s) both in duration and whether it meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1; residual functional capacity to det ermine whether an individual can perform past relev ant work; and residual functional I capacity along with vocational factors (e.g., age, education, and work experienc e) to determine if an individual can adjust to other work. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4); 20 CFR 416.945.

If an individual is found disabled, or not disabled, at any step, a determination or decision is made with no need to evaluate subsequent steps. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4). If a determination cannot be made that an individual is disabled, or not disabled, at a particular step, the next step is required. 20 CFR 416.920 (a)(4). If an impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, an indi vidual's residual functional capacity is assessed before moving from Step 3 to St ep 4. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4); 20 CFR 416.945. Residual f unctional capacity is the most an indiv idual can do d espite the limitations based on all relevant evidence. 20 CF R 945(a)(1). An individual's residual functional capacity assessment is eval uated at both Steps 4 and 5. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4). In determining disability, an i ndividual's functional capacity to perform basic work activities is evaluated and if found that the individ ual h as the ability to

perform basic work activities without significant limitation, disability will not be found. 20 CFR 416.994(b)(1)(iv). In general, the indi vidual has the responsibility to prove disability. 20 CFR 4 16.912(a). An impairment or combi nation of impairments is not severe if it does not signific antly limit an i ndividual's physical or m ental ability to do basic work activities. 20 CFR 416.921(a). The in dividual has the responsibility to provide evidence of prior work experience; efforts to work; and any other factor showing how the impairment affects the ability to work. 20 CFR 416.912(c)(3)(5)(6).

As outlined above, the first step looks at the i ndividual's current work activity. In the record presented, Claimant is not involved in substantial gainful activity and testified that she has not worked since 2005. Theref ore, she is not dis qualified from receiving disability benefits under Step 1.

The severity of the individ ual's alleged impairment(s) is considered under Step 2. The individual bears the burden to present sufficient objective medical evidence to substantiate the alleged disa bling impairments. In order to be considered disabled for MA purpos es, the impairment must be severe. 20 CFR 916. 920(a)(4)(ii); 20 CFR 916.920(b). An impairment, or combination of impairments, is severe if it significantly limits an in dividual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities regardless of age, education and work experience. 20 CFR 916.920(a)(4)(ii); 20 CFR 916.920(c). Basic work activities means the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. 20 CFR 916.921(b). Examples include:

- 1. Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
- 2. Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
- 3. Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
- 4. Use of judgment;
- 5. Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and
- 6. Dealing with changes in a routine work setting. *Id.*

The second step allows for dismissal of a di sability claim obviously lacking in medical merit. *Higgs v Bowe n*, 880 F2d 860, 862 (CA 6, 1988). The severity requirement may still be employed as an admin istrative convenience to screen o ut claims that are totally groundless solely from a medical standpoint. *Id.* at 863 *citing Farris v Sec of Health and Human Services*, 773 F2d 85, 90 n.1 (CA 6, 1985). An impairment qualif ies as non-severe only if, regardless of a claimant's age, education, or work experience, the impairment would not affect the claimant's ability to work. *Salmi v Sec of Health and Human Services*, 774 F2d 685, 692 (CA 6, 1985).

In the present case, Claimant alleges dis ability due t o recurrent urine tract infections, chronic pelvic pain, anxiety, depression and obsessive compulsive disorder.

On January 2, 2012, Claimant presented to the emergency department complaining of abdominal and pelvic pain. Claimant was alert and oriented to person, place and time. She was in no acut e distress. The exam ining phy sician noted that Claimant had recently been seen in the em ergency department on December 5, 9, 13, 14, 21, 25, 28 and 31st of 2011 for t he same s ymptoms. It was noted Claimant smokes less than a pack per day and has good social support. She had tenderness in the suprapubic area and lower abdomen. There was no guarding, rebound tender ness or Murphy's or obturator sign present. The transvagina I ultrasound was nor mal. Claimant was diagnosed with an acut e pelv ic inflammatory diseas e and prescrib ed Cipro and discharged.

On January 9, 2012, Claimant presented to the emergency department with bladder spasms. No impair ments were noted during the functional assessment. The medical records indicate that Claim ant asked the attending nurse to talk with the physic ian regarding pain medic ation. Cla imant was administer ed Toradol. Ativan could not be given because Claimant was driv ing. She was prescribed Ativ an to take when she got home. She was disc harged in stable conditi on. Claimant reported her pain lev el at discharge was 10/10 and she wanted to speak to someone to complain.

On January 10, 2012, Claimant presented to the emergency department with shar p pelvic pain radiating down bilateral legs. It was noted that Claimant was given Cipr o and Levsin during her last ER v isit but she lo st the prescription and did not take the medication as directed. Claimant stated the on ly thing that works for her is Vicodin. Claimant was alert and orient ed to person, time, and place. She was anxious and in moderate distress. Her mood and affect were normal. She had moderate tenderness in the right lower quadrant and lower abdomen with no guarding. Labe results showed no significant pathogens. Claimant repeated her requests for narcotic pain medication and became upset and agitated, re fusing to leave the em ergency department after being discharged because no narcotic s were prescribed. It was not ed that she was offered multiple medications for her condition, Levsin, Pyridium, Toradol, Motrin an Ultram. She refused all medications stati ng that nothing works but Vicodin. S he was dis charged in stable condition.

On June 23, 2012, Claimant presented to t he emergency depart ment with the flu and body aches. She was in no ac ute distress. She was oriented to nam e, location, time and event. She appeared to be in pain. Claimant left t he emergency department prior to being treated. She stated she was leav ing for personal reasons and the long wait time.

On June 27, 2012, Claimant presented to t he emergency department with abdominal pain. She was oriented to person, plac e and time and appeared to be in no acute distress. She had tenderness in the suprapubic area. She was diagnosed with chronic suprapubic abdominal pain of unknown cause and discharged.

On July 22, 2012, Claimant presented to t he emergency department wit h pelvic pain. She was alert and in no acut e distress. She reported smoking a pack a day. Sh e answered "no" to the question of "have you recently felt down, depressed, or hopeless," and "no" to all following ment al status questions. Claim ant was administered Zofran and Morphine and discharged ambulatory.

On July 23, 2012, Claimant presented to t he emergency department wit h pelvic pain . Claimant left the emergency department before registra tion and triage. She wa s unaccompanied. She appeared aler t, oriented x4, coherent and in no acute distress. She stated she was leaving due to the long waiting time.

On December 10, 2012, Claimant was referred for a psychological evaluation by the department. The examining psy chologist opined that the results of the evaluation, to include the results of the psychological instruments and Claimant's presentation throughout the evaluation, indicate that she has a long history of psychological distress characterized by Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, Generalized Anxiety Disorder and Major Depressive Dis order. Claimant st ated she has received t reatment on and off since she was 16. In 2010, she reported she spent one month at the because of a severe psychiatric crisis. At the time of this evaluation, Claimant indicated she has multiple m edical problems that leave her in severe pain and she has significantly reduced physical capabilities as a result. The psycholog ist opined that Claimant e xhibits mildly limited capab ilities to under stand, retain, and fo llow simp le instructions and to perform and complete si mple tasks. She appears to have severely impaired c apabilities to intera ct appropriately and effect ively with co-workers and supervisors, and to adapt to changes in the work setting. It is suspected that her severe psychological condition would result in seve rely impaired capacity to do work-related activities. Diagnoses: Ax is I: Obsessive Compulsive Disorder, severe; Generalized Anxiety Disorder, with Social Anxiety; Majo r Depressive Disorder, recurrent, severe without psychotic features; Axis I II: Claimant reported that since childhood she has had chronic pelvic pain which can be debilitating at times. She stated she als o has GERD, asthma and low thyroid; Axis IV: Claimant exhibited severe psychosocial stressors associated with severe financial problems, a severe psychiatric condition, a very limited primary support system, social and interpers onal isolations, medical pr oblems and chronic pain, and reduced functional capabilities; Axis V: Current GAF=49. Prognosis is poor as Claimant is in need of ongoing intensive psychological treatment.

As previously noted, Claimant bears the burden to pr esent sufficient objec tive medical evidence to substantiate the alleged disab ling impair ment(s). As summarized abov e, Claimant has presented some limited medical evidence establishing that she does have some physical limitations on her ability to per form basic work activities. The medica I evidence has established that Claimant has an impairment, or combination thereof, that has more than a *de min imis* effect on Claimant's basic work activities. Further, the impairments have las ted continuous ly for twelve months; t herefore, Claim ant is not disqualified from receipt of MA-P benefits under Step 2.

In the third step of the seque ntial an alysis of a disability claim, the trier of fact must determine if the indiv idual's impairment, or combination of impairm ents, is listed in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of 20 CF R, Part 404. Claimant has alleged physical an d

mental disabling impairments due to recurrent urine tract infections, chronic pelvic pain, anxiety, depression and obsessive compulsive disorder.

Listing 3. 00 (respiratory system), Listi ng 5.00 (digestive system), Listing 6. 00 (genitourinary impairments), Listing 9.00 (endocrine di sorders), and Listing 12.0 0 (mental disorders), were considered in light of the object ive evidence. Based on the foregoing, it is found that Claimant's impairment(s) does not meet the intent and severity requirement of a listed impairment; theref ore, Claimant cannot be found disabled at Step 3. According ly, Claiman t's elig ibility is considered under Step 4. 20 CFR 416.905(a).

The fourth step in analyzing a disability claim requires an assessment of the individual's residual f unctional capacity ("RFC") and pas t relevant employment. 20 CF R 416.920(a)(4)(iv). An individual is not disabled if he/she can perform past relevant work. *Id.*; 20 CFR 416.960(b)(3). Past relevant work is work that has been performed within the past 15 years that was a substantial gainful activity and that lasted long enough for the individual to lear n the position. 20 CFR 416.960(b)(1). Vocational fact ors of age, education, and work experience, and whet her the past relevant employment exists in significant numbers in the national economy are not considered. 20 CFR 416.960(b)(3). RFC is as sessed based on impairment(s) and any r elated symptoms, such as pain, which may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what can be done in a work setting. RFC is the most that can be done, despite the limitations.

Claimant has a history of less than gainful employment. As such, there is no past work for Claima nt to perform, nor are there past work skills to t ransfer to other work occupations. Accordingly, Step 5 of the sequential analysis is required.

In Step 5, an assessment of the individua I's residual functional capacity and age, education, and work experience is consider ed to determine whet her an adjustment to other work can be made. 20 CFR 416.920(4)(v). At the time of h earing, Claimant was 31 years old and was, thus, considered to be a younger individual for MA-P purposes. Claimant has a high school equivalent education and some college. Disability is found if an individual is unable to adjust to other work. *Id.* At this po int in the analysis, the burden shifts from Claimant to the Department to present proof that Claimant has the residual capacity to substantial gainful employment. 20 CF R 416.960(2); Richardson v Sec of Health and Human Services, 735 F2d 962, 964 (CA 6, 1984). While a vocational expert is not required, a finding supported by substantial evidence that the individua 1 has the vocational qualifications to perform specific job s is needed to meet the burden. O'Banner v Sec of Health and Human Services , 587 F2d 321, 323 (CA 6, 1978). Medical-Vocational quidelines found at 20 CFR Subpart P, Appendix II, may be used to satisfy the burden of proving that the individual can perform specific jobs in the national economy. Heckler v Campbell, 461 US 458, 467 (1983); Kirk v Secretary, 667 F2d 524, 529 (CA 6, 1981) cert den 461 US 957 (1983). The age for younger individuals (under 50) generally will not serious ly affect the ability to adjust to other work. 20 CF R 416.963(c).

In this case, the evidence reveals that Cla imant suffers from re current urine tract infections, chronic pelvic pain, anxiety, depression and obsessive compulsive disorder.

The objective medical evidence notes no ph ysical limitations. T he one psychological evaluation completed by a psychologist the department referred Claimant to opined that Claimant is not capable of working with others and has a poor prognosis. The psychologist based his opinion on her self-report as there were no records available t o review at the time of evaluation. Howeve r, as documented by the multitude of medical records from the emergency department, Claimant is always oriented to pers on, place and time and there is no mention of her depression or obsessive compulsive disorder.

In light of the foregoing, it is found that Claimant main tains the residual functional capacity for work activities on a regular and continuing basis which includes the ability to meet the phys ical and ment al demands required to perform at least light work as defined in 20 CF R 416.967(b). After review of the ent ire record using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines [20 CFR 404, Subpar t P, Appendix II] as a gu ide, specifically Rule 202.20, it is found that Claimant is not dis abled for purposes of the MA-P program at Step 5.

The department's Bridges Eligibility Manual contains the following policy statements and instructions for caseworkers regarding the State Disability As sistance program: to receive State Disability Assist ance, a person must be disabled, caring for a disable d person or age 65 or older. BEM, Item 261, p 1. Because Claimant does not meet the definition of disabled under the MA-P program and because the evidence of record does not establish that Claimant is unable to work for a period exc eeding 90 days, Claimant does not meet the disability criteria for State Disability Assistance benefits.

DECISION AND ORDER

The Administrative Law Judge, based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, finds Claimant not disa bled for purpos es of the MA -P/Retro-MA and SDA benef it programs.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

The Department's determination is **AFFIRMED**.

Vicli Z.

Vicki L. Armstrong Administrative Law Judge for Maura D. Corrigan, Director Department of Human Services

Date Signed: August 12, 2013

Date Mailed: August 13, 2013

NOTICE: Administrative Hearings may or der a rehearing or reconsideration on either its own motion or at t he request of a party within 30 days of the mailing date of this Decision and Order. Administrative Hear ings will not orde r a rehearing or reconsideration on the Department's mo tion where the final decis ion cannot be implemented within 90 days of the filing of the original request.

The Claimant may appeal the Decision and Order to Circuit Court within 30 days of the mailing of the Decision and Order or, if a timely request for rehearing was made, within 30 days of the receipt date of the rehearing decision.

Claimant may request a rehearing or reconsideration for the following reasons:

- A rehearing <u>MAY</u> be granted if there is newly discovered evidence that could affect the outcome of the original hearing decision.
- A reconsideration <u>MAY</u> be granted for any of the following reasons:
 - misapplication of manual policy or law in the hearing decision,
 - typographical errors, mathematical erro r, or other obvious errors in the hearing decision that effect the substantial rights of the claimant:
 - the failure of the ALJ to address other relevant issues in the hearing decision.

Request must be submitted through the local DHS office or directly to MAHS by mail at Michigan Administrative Hearings Reconsideration/Rehearing Request P. O. Box 30639

Lansing, Michigan 48909-07322

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