STATE OF MICHIGAN MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING SYSTEM ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

IN THE MATTER OF:



Reg. No.: 2013-31627 Issue No.: 2009; 4031

Case No.: Hearing Date:

County:

June 12, 2013 Manistee

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Vicki L. Armstrong

HEARING DECISION

This matter is before the undersigned Admi nistrative Law Jud ge upon Claimant's request for a hearing made pursuant to Mi chigan Compiled Laws 400.9 and 400.37, which gov ern the administrative hearing a nd appeal process. After due notice, a telephone hearing was commenced on June 12, 2013, from Lansing , Michigan. Claimant, and her daughter, personally appeared and testified. Participants on behalf of the Department of H uman Services (Depa rtment) included Eligib ility Specialist

ISSUE

Whether the Department of Human Serv ices (the department) properly denied Claimant's application for Medical Ass istance (MA-P), Retro-MA and State Dis ability Assistance (SDA)?

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Administrative Law Judge, based upon the competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record, finds as material fact:

- (1) On November 7, 2012, Claimant filed an application for MA-P, Retro-MA and SDA benefits alleging disability.
- (2) On January 17, 2013, the Medical Review Team (MRT) denied Claimant's application for MA-P and Retro-MA i ndicating that she was capable of performing other work based on her non- exertional impairment. SDA was denied due to lack of duration. (Depart Ex. A, pp 1-2).
- (3) On February 1, 2013, the department caseworker sent Claimant notic e that her application was denied.
- (4) On February 27, 2013, Claimant fil ed a request for a hearing to contest the department's negative action.

- (5) On April 29, 2013, the State Hearing Review T eam (SHRT) found Claimant was not disabled and retained the capacity to perform a wide range of simple, unskilled work. (Depart Ex B, pp 1-2).
- (6) Claimant has a history of depression, anxiety and panic disorder.
- (7) Claimant is a 53 year old wom an whos e birthday is Claimant is 5'5" tall a nd weighs 125 lbs. Claimant co mpleted high school and has one year of college.
- (8) Claimant was appealing the denial of Social Securi ty disability benefits at the time of the hearing.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Medical Assistance (MA) program is established by Subchapter XIX of Chapter 7 of The Public Health & Welfare Act, 42 USC 1397, and is administered by the Department, (DHS or department), pursuant to MCL 400.10 *et seq.* and MCL 400.105. Department policies are found in the Bridges Adminis trative Manual (BAM), the Bridges Eligibilit y Manual (BEM), and the Reference Tables Manual (RFT).

Disability is defined as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental im pairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expect ed to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 20 CFR 416.905(a). The person claiming a physical or mental disability has the burden to esta blish it through the use of competent medical evidence from qualified medical sources such as his or her medical history, clinica l/laboratory findings, diagnosis/prescri bed treatment, prognosis for recovery and/or medical assessment of ability to do work-related ac tivities o r ability to reason and make appropriate mental adjustments, if a mental disability is alleged. 20 CRF 413.913. An individual's subjective pain com plaints ar e not, in and of themselves, sufficient to establish disab ility. 20 CF R 416.908; 2 0 CFR 4 16.929(a). Similarly, conclusor y statements by a physician or mental health professional that an individual is disabled or blind, absent supporting medical evidence, is insufficient to establish disability. 20 CFR 416.927.

When determining disability, the federal regulations require several factors to be considered including: (1) the location/duration/frequency/intensity of an applicant's pain; (2) the type/dosage/effectiveness/side effects of any medication the applicant has takes to relieve pain; (3) any treatment other than pain medication that the applicant has received to relieve pain; and, (4) the effect of the applicant's pain on his or her ability to do basic work activities. 20 CFR 416.929(c)(3). The applicant's pain must be assessed to determine the extent of his or her functional limitation(s) in light of the objective medical evidence presented. 20 CFR 416.929(c)(2).

In order to determine whether or not an individual is disabled, federal regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation process be utilized. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(1). The five-step analysis requires the trier of fact to cons ider an individual's current work activit y;

the severity of the impairment(s) both in duration and whether it meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1; residual functional capacity to det ermine whether an individual can perform past relev ant work; and residual functional capacity along with vocational factors (e.g., age, education, and work experienc e) to determine if an individual can adjust to other work. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4); 20 CFR 416.945.

If an individual is found disabled, or not disabled, at any step, a determination or decision is made with no need to evaluate subsequent steps. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4). If a determination cannot be made that an individual is disabled, or not disabled, at a particular step, the next step is required. 20 CFR 416.920 (a)(4). If an impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, an indi vidual's residual functional capacity is assessed before moving from Step 3 to Step 4. 20 CF R 416.920(a)(4); 20 CFR 416.945. Residual f unctional capacity is the most an indiv idual can do d espite the limitations based on all relevant evidence. 20 CF R 945(a)(1). An individual's residual functional capacity assessment is eval uated at both Steps 4 and 5. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4). In determining disability, an individual's functional capacity to perform basic work activities is evaluated and if found that the individ ual h as the ability to perform basic work activities without significant limitation, disability will not be found. 20 CFR 416.994(b)(1)(iv). In general, the indi vidual has the responsibility to prove disability. 20 CFR 4 16.912(a). An impairment or combi nation of impairments is not severe if it does not signific antly limit an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 CFR 416.921(a). The in dividual has the responsibility to provide evidence of prior work experience; efforts to work; and any other factor showing how the impairment affects the ability to work. 20 CFR 416.912(c)(3)(5)(6).

As outlined above, the first step looks at the i ndividual's current work activity. In the record presented, Claimant is not involved in substantial gainful activity and testified that she has not worked since October, 2011. T herefore, she is not disqualified from receiving disability benefits under Step 1.

The severity of the individ ual's alleged impairment(s) is considered under Step 2. The individual bears the burden to present sufficient objective medical evidence to substantiate the alleged disabling impairments. In order to be considered disabled for MA purposes, the impairment must be seevere. 20 CFR 916. 920(a)(4)(ii); 20 CFR 916.920(b). An impairment, or combination of impairments, is severe if it significantly limits an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities regardless of age, education and work experience. 20 CFR 916.920(a)(4)(ii); 20 CFR 916.920(c). Basic work activities means the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. 20 CFR 916.921(b). Examples include:

- 1. Physical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
- 2. Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
- 3. Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;

- 4. Use of judgment;
- 5. Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and
- 6. Dealing with changes in a routine work setting. *Id.*

The second step allows for dismissal of a disability claim obviously lacking in medical merit. Higgs v Bowen, 880 F2d 860, 862 (CA 6, 1988). The severity requirement may still be employed as an admin istrative convenience to screen out claims that are totally groundless solely from a medical standpoint. *Id.* at 863 citing Farris v Sec of Health and Human Services, 773 F2d 85, 90 n.1 (CA 6, 1985). An impairment qualifies as non-severe only if, regardless of a claimant's age, education, or work experience, the impairment would not affect the claimant's ability to work. Salmi v Sec of Health and Human Services, 774 F2d 685, 692 (CA 6, 1985).

In the present case, Claimant alleges disability due to depression, anxiety and panic disorder.

In January , 2012, Claimant was struggling with anxiety and the Se rtraline was not working very well. She was stable, but admitted to continuous suicidal thoughts. She was started on Abilify and Diazepam and instructed to continue Sertraline. Clonazepam was discontinued because it was not helping, even with a combination of a high dose of Sertraline. It was found that the Diazepam did not work at all. Claimant abused the Alprazolam because of the rapid onset and was taking up to 15 tablets a day. The Clonazepam seemed to work well, except that taking a full dose was too sedating so she was taking it morning and night, and a third dose when she felt stressed. The Clonazepam, although not completely effective, worked better than any other medications she was taking. She brought the Diazepam back to the office and it was disposed of. The Clonazepam was restarted for breakthrough panic attacks.

In February, 2012, Claimant followed up with her treating physician for anxiety. She stated the Clonazepam and Sertra line were not working fully, but she thought it was as good as she was going to get. She continued to have mild suicidal ideation but no plan to pursue.

In March, 2012, Claimant saw her treating physician for depr ession and panic attacks. She stated the panic attacks were getting worse. She was trying to apply for a job and as she was getting out clothing she started to get anxious, resulting in a panic attack and she could not conti nue. She was very anxious about mingling with other people. She explained that when she gets a panic attack, she goes outside, walks, or goes for a ride. She has used Buspar in the past without benefit. She does not tolerate Valium. She abus ed Xanax in the past. She has been on numerous combinations and the Sertraline and Clonazepam she is c urrently taking are the best, despite br eakthrough problems.

In June, 2012, Claimant present ed at her treating physician's office, doing worse and reported she was on a waiting list for mental health. She had suicidal ideation with a plan and s tated that she woul d not promise to call first. She also told the Centra Wellness intake person that she would not promise to call first and told her the plan (exhaust hose). However, Claimant has been an inpatient in a psychiatric hospital twice in the past and refuses to ever go again. S he noted that she cannot take ac tion at this time because she is a T-ball coach fo r her granddaughter. Bupropion was added and she committed to not taking any suicidal acti on while giving it a try. Claimant ended up stopping the Bupropi on due to worsening depress ion. She was taking only the Sertraline and Clonazepam. She had tried numerous other combinations without success and wanted to just stay with her current regimen.

On August 28, 2012, Cla imant underwent a psychiatric evaluation at During the intake, the social wo rker noted that Claiman t's treating physician did not believe Claimant was suicidal. Cla imant also agreed to remove the tube from her car during the intake. At the psychiatr ic evaluation, Claimant told the psychiatrist that she still had the hose and duct tape in the back of her car and that she has had the hose in the back of her car for a couple of months. She reported that she has suicidal ideation "every day." As for gassing herself, she stated, "I'm kind of in-between that." She said, "it's going to be something to make me snap. It could be something trivial." When asked for an example, she stated, "an argument maybe. I had a big fight with my son. He blames me for the divorce. He c ould make me snap. He's arrogant, it's all black or white." As for her suicidal ideation, she told the psychiatrist that "this is my last ditch effort, last time I am trying." She has been psychiatrically hospitalized twice, the first time in 2000, for overusing Xanax. Then again in 2003, after a fight with her spouse she overdosed on Nardil. Claimant was very talkat ive and seemed to enjoy the interaction. She had good eye contact. Her speech was slightly fast but not pressured. Her thought processes were fairly linear. She endorsed chronic suicidal ideation but oddly denied depression; she appeared euthymic, even bright. S he appeared to be of The examining psychiatrist opined that Claimant was above-average intelligence. incongruously happy. She said that she is not depressed, yet complained of chronic suicidal ideation. The potential s cenarios that she gave for killing herself we re trivial. The psychiatrist believed her anxiety was r eally sec ondary to her substances. He opined that over time, addictive behavior can breed anxiety, because anxiety then provides a subconscious rationale for c ontinuing the addictive behavior. As for employment, the psychiatrist did not know why she guit her last job at believed she may have had a vasovagal reaction, but she admitted that she did not quit after her fainting episode. She was also excelling at work and was obviously intelligent. The psychiatrist suggested increasing he r Zoloft, although he was dubious of any benefit. Diagnosis: Ax is I: Anx iety Disorder; Sedative-hypnotic dependence; Axis II: Personality Disorder; Axis III: Stomach problems, Multiple fractures of right ankle; Ax is IV: Primary support issues, no job; Axis V: GAF=55.

In September, 2012, Claimant met with her treating physician and told him she had been to see a psychiatrist who recommended she increase the Sertraline and she was considering it. According to Claimant 's Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment, apparently completed by the social worker and signed by the psychiatrist, Claimant was markedly limited in her ability to remember locations and work-like

procedures; understand and r emember detailed instructions; carry out detailed instructions; maintain attention and co ncentration for extended periods; work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them; complete a normal workday and worksheet without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods; interact appropriately with the general public, ask simple questions or request assistance, respond appropriately to change in the work setting; travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation and to set realistic goals or make plans independently of others.

As previously noted, Claimant bears the burden to pr esent sufficient objective medical evidence to substantiate the alleged disab ling impair ment(s). As summarized abov e, Claimant has presented some limited medical evidence establishing that she does have some mental limitations on her ability to perform basic wo rk activities. The medical evidence has established that Claimant has an impairment, or combination thereof, that has more than a *de min imis* effect on Claimant's basic work activities. Further, the impairments have lasted continuously for twelve months; therefore, Claimant is not disqualified from receipt of MA-P benefits under Step 2.

In the third step of the seque ntial an alysis of a disability claim, the trier of fact must determine if the indiv idual's impairment, or combination of impairm ents, is listed in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of 20 CF R, Part 404. Claim ant has alleged physical an d mental disabling impairments due to depression, anxiety and panic disorder.

Listing 12. 00 (mental disorders) was cons idered in light of the objective evidenc e. Based on the foregoing, it is found that Claimant's impairm ents do not meet the intent and severity requirement of a listed impairm ent; therefore, Claimant cannot be found disabled at Step 3. Accordin gly, Claimant's eligibility is considered under Step 4. 20 CFR 416.905(a).

The fourth step in analyzing a disability claim requires an assessment of the individual's residual f unctional capacity ("RFC") and pas t relevant employment. 20 CF R 416.920(a)(4)(iv). An individual is not disabled if he/she can perform past relevant work. *Id.*; 20 CFR 416.960(b)(3). Past relevant work is work that has been performed within the past 15 years that was a substantial gainful activity and that lasted long enough for the individual to learn the position. 20 CFR 416.960(b)(1). Vocational fact ors of age, education, and work experience, and whether the past relevant employment exists in significant numbers in the national economy are not considered. 20 CFR 416.960(b)(3). RFC is as sessed based on impairment(s) and any related symptoms, such as pain, which may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what can be done in a work setting. RFC is the most that can be done, despite the limitations.

To determine the physical demands (exertional requirements) of work in the national economy, jobs are classified as sedentary, light, medium, heavy, and very heavy. 2 0 CFR 416.967. Sedentary work involves lifting of no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. 20 CFR 416.967(a). Although a sedentary job is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. *Id.* Jobs

are sedentary if walking and standing are required occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. Light work involves lifting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying objects weighing up to 10 pounds. 20 CFR 416.967(b). Even though weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it invo lves sit ting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. Id. To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, an individual must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities . Id. An individual capable of light work is also capable of sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. *Id.* Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. 20 CFR 416.967(c). An individual capable of performing medium work is also capable of light and sedentary work. Id. Heavy work involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds. 20 CFR 416.967(d). An individual capab le of heavy work is also capable of medium, light, and sedentary work. Id. Finally, very heavy work involves lifting objects weighing more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying objects weighing 50 pounds or more. 20 CFR 416.967(e). An individual capable of very heavy work is able to perform work under all categories. Id.

Limitations or restrictions which affect the ability to meet the demands of jobs other than strength demands (exertional r equirements, e.g., si tting, standing, walking, lifting, carrying, pushing, or pulling) are consider ed nonexertional. 20 CFR 416.969a(a). In considering whether an individual can perform past relevant work, a comparis on of the individual's residual functional capacity to the demands of past relevant work must be made. *Id.* If an individual can no longer do past relevant work, the same residual functional capacity assessment along wit h an individual's age, education, and work experience is considered to determine whet her an individual can adjust to other work which exists in the national economy. Id. Examples of non-exer tional limitations or restrictions include difficulty functioni ng due to nervousness. anxiousness, or depression; difficulty maintaining attention or concent ration; difficulty understanding or remembering detailed instructions; difficulty in seeing or hearing; difficulty tolerating some physical feature(s) of certa in work settings (e.g., can't tolerate dust or fumes); or difficulty performing the manipulative or po stural functions of some work such as reaching, handling , stooping, climbin g, crawlin g, or crouchin q. 20 CF R 416.969a(c)(1)(i) – (vi). If the impairment(s) and related symptoms, such as pain, only affect the ability to perform the non-exertional aspec ts of work-related activities, the rules in Appendix 2 do not direc t factual conc lusions of disabled or not disabled. 20 CFR 416.969a(c)(2). The dete rmination of whether disability exists is based upon the principles in the appropriate sections of the regulations, giving consideration to the rules for specific case situations in Appendix 2. Id.

Claimant's prior work history consists of work as a stock person, office manager and desk clerk. In light of Claimant's testim ony, and in consideration of the Occupational Code, Claimant's prior work is classified as unskilled, medium work.

Claimant testified that she is able to walk a mile and c an lift/carry approx imately 50 pounds. The objective medical evidenc e notes no physical limitations. According t o Claimant's Mental Re sidual Functional Capacity Ass essment, Claimant was markedly limited in her ability to reme mber locations and work-lik e procedures; understand and remember detailed inst ructions; carry out detailed inst ructions; maintain attention and concentration for extended periods; work in coordination with or proximity to others without being distracted by them; complete a normal workday and worksheet witho ut interruptions from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace e without an unreasonable nu mber and length of rest periods; interact appropriately with the general public, ask simple questions or request assistance, respond appropriately to change in the work setting; travel in unfamiliar places or use public transportation and to set realistic goals or make plans independent ly of others. Howev er, the medic al documentation in the file does not support the assessment and the assessment is given no weight.

If the impairment or combination of impairments does not limit an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, it is not a severe impairment(s) and disab ility does not exist. 20 CFR 416.920. In consi deration of Claimant's testimony, medical records, and current limitations, Claimant can be found able to r eturn to past relevant work. Ac cordingly, Step 5 of the sequ ential analysis is not required but will be evaluated.

In Step 5, an assessment of the individua I's residual functional capace ity and age. education, and work experience is consider ed to determine whet her an adjustment to other work can be made. 20 CFR 416.920(4)(v). At the time of h earing, Claimant was 53 years old and was, thus , considered to be appr oaching advanced age for MA-P purposes. Claimant has a high sc hool education. Disability is found if an individual is unable to adjust to other work. *Id.* At this point in the analysis, the burden shifts from Claimant to the Depart ment to present proof that Claimant has the residual capacity to substantial gainful employ ment. 20 CFR 416.960(2); Richardson v Sec of H ealth and Human Se rvices, 735 F2d 962, 964 (CA 6, 1984). While a vocational expert is no t required, a finding supported by substantial evidence that the individual has th е vocational qualifications to perform specif ic jobs is needed to O'Banner v Sec of Health and Human Services . 587 F2d 321, 323 (CA 6, 1978). Medical-Vocational guidelines found at 20 CFR Subpart P. Appendix II, may be used to satisfy the burden of proving that the individual can perform specific jobs in the national economy. Heckler v Campbell, 461 US 458, 467 (1983); Kirk v Secretary, 667 F2d 524, 529 (CA 6, 1981) cert den 461 US 957 (1983).

In this case, the evidence reveals that Cla imant suffers from de pression, anxiety and panic disorder. The objective medical evidence notes no phy sical limitations. Had Claimant not been found able to return to past relevant work, Claimant would have been found able to maintain the residual functional capacity for work activities on a regular and continuing bas is which includes the ability to meet the physical and mental demands required to perform at least medium work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(c). Using the Medical-Vocational Guidelines [20 CFR 404, Subpart P, Appendix II] as a guide, specifically Rule 203.14, it is found that Claimant is not disabled for purposes of the MA-P program at Step 5.

The department's Bridges Eligibility Manual contains the following policy statements and instructions for caseworkers regarding the State Disability As sistance program: to receive State Disability Assist ance, a person must be dis abled, caring for a disable d person or age 65 or older. BEM, Item 261, p 1. Because Claimant does not meet the definition of disabled under the MA-P program and because the evidence of record does not establish that Claimant is unable to work for a period exc eeding 90 days, Claimant does not meet the disability criteria for State Disability Assistance benefits.

DECISION AND ORDER

The Administrative Law Judge, based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, finds Claimant not disa bled for purpos es of the MA -P/Retro-MA and SDA benef it programs.

Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

The Department's determination is **AFFIRMED**.

Vicki L. Armstrong
Administrative Law Judge
for Maura D. Corrigan, Director
Department of Human Services

Date Signed: June 25, 2013

Date Mailed: June 25, 2013

NOTICE: Administrative Hearings may or der a rehearing or reconsideration on either its own motion or at the request of a party within 30 days of the mailing date of this Decision and Order. Administrative Hear ings will not orde rarehearing or reconsideration on the Department's motion where the final decision cannot be implemented within 90 days of the filing of the original request.

The Claimant may appeal the Decision and Order to Circuit Court within 30 days of the mailing of the Decision and Order or, if a ti mely request for rehearing was made, within 30 days of the receipt date of the rehearing decision.

Claimant may request a rehearing or reconsideration for the following reasons:

- A rehearing **MAY** be granted if there is newly discovered evidence that could affect the outcome of the original hearing decision.
- A reconsideration <u>MAY</u> be granted for any of the following reasons:
 - misapplication of manual policy or law in the hearing decision,
 - typographical errors, mathematical erro r, or other obvious errors in the hearing decision that effect the substantial rights of the claimant:
 - the failure of the ALJ to address other relevant issues in the hearing decision.

Request must be submitted through the local DHS office or directly to MAHS by mail at Michigan Administrative Hearings
Reconsideration/Rehearing Request
P. O. Box 30639
Lansing, Michigan 48909-07322

VLA/las

cc: