STATE OF MICHIGAN MICHIGAN ADMINISTRATIVE HEARING SYSTEM ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

IN THE MATTER OF:



Reg. No.: Issue No.: Case No.: Hearing Date: County: 2012-44709 2009; 4031

June 14, 2012 Delta County

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Vicki L. Armstrong

HEARING DECISION

This matter is before the undersigned Admini strative Law Judge upon the Claimant's request for a hearing made pursuant to Mi chigan Compiled Laws 400.9 and 400.37, which gov ern the administrative hearing a nd appeal process. After due notice, a telephone hearing was commenced on June 14, 2012, from Lansing , Michigan. Claimant personally appeared and testified. Participants on behalf of the Department of Human Services (Department) included Eligibility Specialist

During the hearing, Claimant wa ived the time period for the i ssuance of this decision in order to allow for the submission of additional medical evidence. The new evidence was forwarded to the State Hearing Review Team (SHRT) for consideration. On August 30, 2012, the SHRT found Claimant was not disabled. This matter is now before the undersigned for a final decision.

<u>ISSUE</u>

Whether the Department of Human Serv ices (the department) properly denied Claimant's application for Medical Ass istance (MA-P), Retro-MA and State Dis ability Assistance (SDA)?

FINDINGS OF FACT

The Administrative Law Judge, based upon the competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record, finds as material fact:

- (1) On August 24, 2011, Claimant appl ied for MA-P, Retro-MA and SDA benefits.
- (2) On March 25, 2012, t he Medical Review Team (MRT) denied Claimant's MA application indicating Claimant is capable of performing other work,

pursuant to 20 CFR 416.920(f). MRT denied Claimant's SDA app lication due to lack of duration. (Department Exhibit A, pages 1-2).

- (3) On March 30, 2012, the department ca seworker sent Claimant notice that his application was denied.
- (4) On April 9, 2012, Claimant filed a request for a hearing to contest the department's negative action.
- (5) On May 18, 2012, the State Hear ing Review Team (SHRT) upheld the denial of MA-P and Retro-MA benefits indicating Claimant retains the capacity to perform a wide ranger of si mple, unskilled, light work. SDA was denied due to lack of duration. (Department Exhibit B, pp 1-2).
- (6) Claimant has a hi story of degenerative disc disease, Aspergers, depression, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
- (7) Claimant is a 46 year old man whose birthday is Claimant is 5'11" tall and weighs 184 lbs. Claimant completed high school and last worked in November, 2009.
- (8) Claimant was appealing the denial of Social Security disability at the time of the hearing.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Medical Assistance (MA) program is established by Subchapter XIX of Chapter 7 of The Public Health & Welfare Act, 42 USC 1397, and is administered by the Department, (DHS or department), pursuant to MCL 400.10 *et seq.* and MCL 400.105. Department policies are found in the Bridges Adminis trative Manual (BAM), the Bridges Elig ibility Manual (BEM), and the Reference Tables Manual (RFT).

The State Disability A ssistance (SDA) program which provides financial assistance for disabled persons is established by 2004 PA 344. The Department of Human Service s (DHS or department) admin isters the SDA program pursuant to MCL 400.10, *et seq.*, and Mich Admin Code, Rules 400.3151-400.3180. Department policies are found in the Bridges Administrative Manual (BAM), th *e* Bridges Eligibilit y Manual (BEM) and the Reference Tables Manual (RFT).

Current legislative amendments to the Act delineate eligibility criteria as implemented by department policy set forth in program manual s. 2004 PA 344, Se c. 604, es tablishes the State Disability Assistance program. It reads in part:

Sec. 604 (1). The department sha II operate a state di sability assistance program. Except as provided in subsection (3), persons eligible for this program shall includ e needy citizens of the United States or aliens exempt from the Supplemental Security Income citizenship re quirement who are at least 18 years of age or emanc ipated minors meeting one or more of the following requirements:

(b) A per son with a physical or mental impairment whic h meets federal SSI disab ility standards, exce pt that the minimum duration of the dis ability shall be 90 days. Substance abuse alone is not defined as a basis for eligibility.

Specifically, this Act provides minimal cash assistance to individuals with some type of severe, temporary disability which prevent s him or her from engaging in substantial gainful work activity for at least ninety (90) days.

Disability is defined as the inability to do any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental im pairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expect ed to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 20 CFR 416.905(a). The person claiming a physical or mental disability has the burden to establish it through the use of competent medical evidence e from qualified medical sources such as his or her medical history, clinica l/laboratory findings, diagnosis/prescri bed treatment, prognosis for recovery and/or medical assessment of ability to do work-related ac tivities or a bility to reason and make appropriate mental adjustments, if a mental disability is alleged. 20 CRF 413.913. An individual's subjective pain com plaints ar e not, in and of themselves, sufficient to establish disab ility. 20 CF R 416.908; 2 0 CFR 4 16.929(a). Similarly, conclusor y statements by a physician or mental health professional that an individual is disabled or blind, absent supporting medical evidence, is insufficient to establish disability. 20 CFR 416.927.

When determining disability, t he federal regulations require several factors to be considered including: (1) the location/ duration/frequency/intensity of an applicant's pain; (2) the type/dosage/effectiveness/side effects of any medication the applicant takes to relieve pain; (3) any treatment other than pain medication that the applicant has received to relieve pain; and, (4) the effect of the applicant's pain on his or her ability to do basic work activities. 20 CFR 416.929(c)(3). The applicant's pain must be assessed to determi ne the ext ent of his or her functi onal limitation(s) in light of the objective medical evidence presented. 20 CFR 416.929(c)(2).

In order to determine whether or not an individual is disabled, federal regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation process be utilized. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(1). The fivestep analysis requires the trier of fact to cons ider an individual's current work activit y; the severity of the impairment(s) both in duration and whether it meets or equals a listed impairment in Appendix 1; residual functional capacity to det ermine whether an individual can perform past relev ant work; and residual functional I capacity along with vocational factors (e.g., age, education, and work experienc e) to determine if an individual can adjust to other work. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4); 20 CFR 416.945. If an individual is found disabled, or not disabled, at any step, a determination or decision is made with no need to evaluate subsequent steps. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4). If a determination cannot be made that an individual is disabled, or not disabled, at a particular step, the next step is required. 20 CFR 416.920 (a)(4). If an impairment does not meet or equal a listed impairment, an indi vidual's residual functional capacity is Step 3 to Step 4. 20 CF assessed before moving from R 416.920(a)(4); 20 CFR 416.945. Residual f unctional capacity is the most an indiv idual can do d espite the limitations based on all relevant evidence. 20 CF R 945(a)(1). An ind ividual's residual functional capacity assessment is eval uated at both Steps 4 and 5. 20 CFR 416.920(a)(4). In determining disability, an i ndividual's functional capacity to perform basic work activities is evaluated and if found that the individ ual h as the ability to perform basic work activities without significant limitation, disability will not be found. 20 CFR 416.994(b)(1)(iv). In general, the indi vidual has the responsibility to prove disability. 20 CFR 4 16.912(a). An impairment or combi nation of impairments is not severe if it does not signific antly limit an i ndividual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities. 20 CFR 416.921(a). The in dividual has the responsibility to provide evidence of prior work experience; efforts to work; and any other factor showing how the impairment affects the ability to work. 20 CFR 416.912(c)(3)(5)(6).

As outlined above, the first step looks at the i ndividual's current work activity. In the record presented, the Claimant is not involved in substantial gainful activity and testified that he has not worked since No vember, 2009. Therefore, he is not disqualified from receiving disability benefits under Step 1.

The severity of the individ ual's alleged impairment(s) is considered under Step 2. The individual bears the burden to present sufficient objective medical evidence to substantiate the alleged disa bling impairments. In order to be considered disabled for MA purpos es, the impairment must be severe. 20 CFR 916. 920(a)(4)(ii); 20 CFR 916.920(b). An impairment, or combination of impairments, is severe if it signific antly limits an in dividual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities regardless of age, education and work experience. 20 CFR 916.920(a)(4)(ii); 20 CFR 916.920(c). Basic work activities means the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs. 20 CFR 916.921(b). Examples include:

- 1. Physical functions such as walk ing, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling;
- 2. Capacities for seeing, hearing, and speaking;
- 3. Understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions;
- 4. Use of judgment;
- 5. Responding appropriately to supervision, co-workers and usual work situations; and

6. Dealing with changes in a routine work setting. *Id.*

The second step allows for dismissal of a di sability claim obviously lacking in medical merit. *Higgs v Bowe n*, 880 F2d 860, 862 (CA 6, 1988). The severity requirement may still be employed as an admin istrative convenience to screen out claims that are totally groundless solely from a medical standpoint. *Id.* at 863 *citing Farris v Sec of Health and Human Services*, 773 F2d 85, 90 n.1 (CA 6, 1985). An impairment qualif ies as non-severe only if, regardless of a claimant's age, education, or work experience, the impairment would not affect the claimant's ability to work. *Salmi v Sec of Health and Human Services*, 774 F2d 685, 692 (CA 6, 1985).

In the present case, Claimant alleges dis ability due to degenerative dis c disease, Asperger's syndrome, depression, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder.

On April 30, 2010, Claimant underwent a DI A Cervical Myelogram which revealed no evidence of spinal stenosis. T here was loss of nor mal cervic al lordosis epicentered above the surgical s ite. Plate and screw transfixion at C5-C6 was n oted from an anterior approach with the hardware intact. Ali gnment at those two levels was seen to be essentially anatomic. There was disc s pace narrowing of mild degree at C3-C4 and C4-C5 with small anterior extradural de fects at C 3-C4 secondary to discogenic osteophytic complex.

On December 17, 2010, Claimant underwent a series of x-rays. X-rays of his Thorac ic thritic changes. His Lumbar spine x-ravs spine showed slight kyphosis with mild ar revealed mild arthritic changes with disc space na rrowing at L4-L5 and L5-S1 and incomplete sacralization of L5 on the left. X-rays of his Pelvis also showed incomplete sacralization of L5 on the left. His bilatera I hand x-rays revealed mild arthritic changes at the 1st metacarpal-carpal joint space and scleros is at the articular surface of the radius with some joint space narrowing at the radial carpal joint. There was also a small bony density at the ulnar st yloid which may represent an old bony fragment. His lef t hand showed mild arthritic changes in the 1st metacarpal-carpal joint space and a small cystic area measuring approximat ely 5 mm at the mid-portion of the middle phalanx of the middle finger. X-rays of his feet and sa croiliac joints wer e negative. His left shoulder x-ray revealed prominent osteophyte formation inferior aspect of the distal left clavicle. X-rays of his right shoulder showed no evidence of any fractures or abnormalities. X-rays of his right knee revealed mild arthritic changes and his left knee was negative for abnormalities.

On December 28, 2010, Claimant's MRI C -Spine with and without contrast revealed moderate disc degeneration with some mild cord compression mostly at the 3-4 lev el with some right sided foraminal narrowing.

On January 24, 2011, Claimant's MRI L- Spine without contrast showed some degenerative findings at the L2-L3, L3-L4, L4-L4 and L5-S1 levels with some mild spinal stenosis at the L2-L3 level and a small right parecentral disc protrusion near the right L4 nerve root.

On March 28, 2011, Claimant underwent a p sychiatric evaluation on behalf of the department. He was neatly dressed, very friendly and cooperative. He was happy and joked about a number of thi ngs during t he evaluation. There were no signs of depression or psychomotor retardation. He reported his sleep and appetite were good, and he us ed medical marijuana. There was no looseness to his associations and no pressured speech. He had som e mild anxiety, but his sensorium was clear. His recent and remote memory was intact and his insight and judgment were fair. The psychiatrist opined that if Claimant were to get Social Security Disabil ity, most of hi s problem s would go away in terms of his complaints of depression and anxiety and there was no need for a follow-up appointment. Diagnosis: Axis I: Depressive dis order; Anxiety disorder; Axis V: GAF=60.

On July 13, 2011, Claimant went to the emergency depar tment demanding a psychological examination because he was upset that no one would prescribe Xanax to him. He stated that he had never had an of ficial psychological examination and felt he was borderline bipolar. Claimant stated he took his last Xanax that morning and his doctor would not refill them for him because they did not feel comfortable doing so. The examining physician found that Claimant's doctors had been trying to wean him off Xanax and switch him to At ivan or Klonopin. The examining physic ian informed Claimant that he would not pres cribe him any Xanax and at the most would prescribe him a few tablets of Ativ an. Claimant agreed and he was encouraged to keep his follow-up appointments.

On July 27, 2011, Claimant underwent a clinical assessment at behavioral health services. Claimant appeared to have significant problems with chronic pain and anxiety as well as depression which had led to some excess ive use of his pain medications especially Vicodin. He adm itted his depression seemed to be getting better in the las t week since he was no longer on the Vic odin, but on Tramadol. The examining psychologist opined that it remained to be seen if Claimant could control his use of the non-opiate pain reliever. Claimant also had a clear problem with marijuana dependence in the past, although much less so in recent months. He appeared to have fairly serious health issues which contributed to his disability. It was noteworthy that Claimant had also been sentenced on a burglar y for breaking in and stealing a woman's underwear. He clearly had mental health issues in addition to chemical dependency and his prognosis was guarded. Diagnosis: Ax is I: Opiate Dependenc e: Marijuana Dependence: Generalized Anxiet y Disorder: Mood Dis order of guestionable etiolo gy; Fetishism; Axis II: Obsessive/Compulsive Disorder and Paranoid/Borderline Traits; Axis III: Degenerative disc disease; arthritis; diabetes; hypertension; Axis V: GAF=50.

On August 19, 2011, Claimant had a follow- up appointment with his n eurologist. Claimant was pleas ant and happy and on the whole, appear ed improved. Claimant stated he was completely off the Vicodin, however, he wanted an increase in his Ultram. The Ultram was prescribed for Claimant's shoulder, neck and low bac k pain. His headaches were relatively controlled at the t ime of the visit. On examination, his neck movements were full and supple. He had multiple tender points in the trapezius muscle on the sites of the cervical area and also in the shoulder area bilat erally. His neurological examination was ot herwise non-focal and within normal limits. Rev iew of systems failed to show any other changes. increasing his Ultram dosage to 3 times a day. Claimant's neurologist explained that he would not give Claimant higher doses of Ultram and t hat the 50 tablet s of 50 mg per month were sufficient. The examining neurol ogist did offer to give Claimant 6 trigger point injections of Kenalog mixed with Marcaine. Claimant tolerated the procedure well.

On August 23, 2011, Claimant met with his psychiatrist. Claimant's affect was constricted. His over all mood was good. His speech was overinclusiv e but baseline. He stated that the KI onopin was definit ely helpful. He wanted to stop taking the Risperdal because of the side effects. Against medical advice, Claimant stopped using the Risperdal. He admitted to taking a Per cocet of his father's last week when he was in pain. He was us ing medical marijuana and found it to be helpful . His psychiatrist also met with Claimant's mother who stated that Glaimant was definitely doing better. The examining psychiatrist opined that giv en Claimant's high anxiety, the pervasive development disorder symptoms and medical issues he struggled with, Claimant would struggle with any type of meaningful empl oyment and he would support disab ility for him. Utilizing the DSM-IV cr iteria, his psychiatrist was unable to give Claimant an Asperger's diagnosis without knowing his exact childhood history.

On September 30, 2011, Claim ant went t o the emer gency department complaining of chronic neck pain. Symptoms were wors ened by twisting and bendi ng and relieved by narcotics. His mood, affect, behavior, judgment and thought content were normal. Claimant's previous primary care physician was contacted and he stated t hat Claimant had been discharged earlier that week from the practice due to obtaining Tramadol from multiple current providers. Claimant was informed that he needed to establish a new local provider and the emergency department would not be renewing his prescriptions.

On December 3, 2011, Claimant went to chronic right neck/shoulder pain. Claim department, with frequent simila r presentations and willing to return home after a Toradol injection. He exhibited t enderness and pain in his right should er, but had no swelling and normal strength. His speec cognition and memory were normal. Hi s appeared anxious. He was requesting Toradol and Prednisone prescriptions.

On February 3, 2012, Claimant underwent a psychological ev aluation. He was twent y minutes late and was pressured, yelling at the psychologist as to having difficulty getting there on time, but offered no excuse other than he could not make it. He was in contact with reality. His self esteem was low. His motor activity was heightened. He expressed a dislike for the dependence he had on his parents. He had lim ited to poor insight. He was spontaneous, pressured and at times v ague, evasive and unorgani zed. He was a very poor historian and reporter of chronol ogy which appeared to relate to his reserve and evasiveness. He was pressured, anxious and emotionally resistant to the intervie w process. He was of average intelligence wit h multiple medical complaint s revolvin g around chronic pain and affectiv e disturbances including di srupted sleep, depression and variable to poor motivation. He alluded to multiple traumatic childhood experiences and was evasive and minimizing of his legal problems revolving around sexual offenses in which he was on a sexual offender list. He tended to displac e blame to others. He described himself as falling ap art since losing his job. He was in limited psychiatric

counseling, stating he no longer participat ed in any s upport groups. The examinin g psychologist opined that Claimant was able to process 1 and 2 part directives given successful management, control and treatment of his Axis I disorders and within the restrictions of his medical condition. Diag nosis: Axis I: Paraphilia; Anxiety disorder; History of cannabis abuse; Axis II: Personality disorder; Axis V: GAF=42.

On February 16, 2012, Claimant saw the pain c linic for an evaluation of both shoulders. No x-rays were taken. In December, 2010, he had x-rays which showed just a little spur on the AC joint on the left at 08. He had an MR I of the left shoulder which s howed the rotator cuff to be intact. He had full active erange of motion. He had good abduction strength against resistance. Good external rotation strength against resistance. Good push off strength against resistance. He was assess sed with bilateral impingement syndrome of shoulders and rotator cuff tend initis. Claimant was injected with Depo-Medrol mixed with 3 ml of Lidocaine in each shoulder.

On May 29, 2012, Claimant went to the emergency department reques ting a shot of Toradol because he had walked all over the parade the day before and was all cramped up. Claimant was alert and oriented, complaining of pain in his back and shoulder.

As previously noted, Claimant bears the burden to pr esent sufficient objec tive medical evidence to substantiate the alleged disab ling impair ment(s). As summarized abov e, Claimant has present ed some limited medical evidence establishing that he does hav e some phys ical limitations on his ability to perform basic work activities based on his discogenic disorders of the back and neck , status post C5-C6 diskectomy and fusion surgery. The medical evidence has estable ished that Claimant has a severe physica. I impairment, or combination the ereof, that has more than a *de m inimis* effect on Claimant's basic work activities. Further, the impairments have la sted continuously for twelve months. Claimant's medically det erminable mental impairments of depression, anxiety and obsessive ecompulsive disorder and history of marijuana abus e, singly and in combination, do not cause more than a minimal limitation in Claimant's ability t o perform basic mental work activities and are therefore non-severe. Therefore, Claimant is not disqualified from receipt of MA-P benefits under Step 2.

In the third step of the seque ntial an alysis of a disability claim, the trier of fact must determine if the indiv idual's impairment, or combination of impairments, is listed in Appendix 1 of Subpart P of 20 CF R, Part 404. Claim ant has alleged physical an d mental disabling impairments due to degenerative disc diseas e, Asperger's syndrome, depression, anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorder.

Listing 1.00 (musculoskeletal system) a nd Listing 12.00 (mental disor ders) wer e considered in light of the obj ective evidence. Based on the foregoing, it is found that Claimant's impairment(s) does not meet the intent and severi ty requirement of a listed impairment; therefore, Claimant cannot be found disabled, or no t disabled, at Step 3. Accordingly, Claimant's eligibility is considered under Step 4. 20 CFR 416.905(a).

The fourth step in analyzing a disability claim requires an assessment of the individual's residual f unctional capacity ("RFC") and pas t relevant em ployment. 20 CF R 416.920(a)(4)(iv). An individual is not disabled if he/she can perform past relevant work.

Id.; 20 CFR 416.960(b)(3). Past relevant work is work that has been performed within the past 15 years that was a substantial gainful activity and that lasted long enough for the individual to lear n the position. 20 CFR 416.960(b)(1). Vocational fact ors of age, education, and work experience, and whet her the past relevant employment exists in significant numbers in the national economy are not considered. 20 CFR 416.960(b)(3). RFC is as sessed based on impairment(s) and any r elated symptoms, such as pain, which may cause physical and mental limitations that affect what can be done in a work setting. RFC is the most that can be done, despite the limitations.

To determine the physical demands (exertional requirements) of work in the national economy, jobs are c lassified as sedentary, light, medium, hea vy, and very heavy. 2 0 CFR 416.967. Sedentary work involves lifting of no more than 10 pounds at a time and occasionally lifting or carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. 20 CFR 416.967(a). Although a sedentary j ob is defined as one which involves sitting, a certain amount of walking and standing is often necessary in carrying out job duties. Id. Jobs are sedentary if walking and standing are r equired occasionally and other sedentary criteria are met. Light work involves li fting no more than 20 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying objects weighing up to 10 pounds. 20 CFR 416.967(b). Even though weight lifted may be very little, a job is in this category when it requires a good deal of walking or standing, or when it invo lves sit ting most of the time with some pushing and pulling of arm or leg controls. *Id.* To be considered capable of performing a full or wide range of light work, an individual must have the ability to do substantially all of these activities . *Id.* An individual capable of light work is also capable of sedentary work, unless there are additional limiting factors such as loss of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time. *Id.* Medium work involves lifting no more than 50 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 25 pounds. 20 CFR 416.967(c). An individual capable of performing medium work is also capable of light and sedentary work. Id. Heavy work involves lifting no more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying of objects weighing up to 50 pounds. 20 CFR 416.967(d). An individual capable of heavy work is also capable of medium, light, and sedentary work. Id. Finally, very heavy work involves lifting objects weighing more than 100 pounds at a time with frequent lifting or carrying objects weighing 50 pounds or more. 20 CFR 416.967(e). An individual c apable of very heavy work is able to perform work under all categories. Id.

Limitations or restrictions which affect the ability to meet the demands of jobs other than equirements, e.g., si tting, standing, walking, lifting strength demands (exertional r carrying, pushing, or pulling) are consider ed nonexertional. 20 CFR 416.969a(a). In considering whether an individual can perform past relevant work, a comparis on of the individual's residual functional capacity to the demands of past relevant work must be made. Id. If an individual can no longer do past relevant work, the same residual functional capacity assessment along wit h an individual's age, education, and work experience is considered to determine whet her an individual can adjust to other work which exists in the national economy. *Id.* Examples of non-exer tional limitations or ng due to nervousness, restrictions include difficulty functioni an xiousness, or depression; difficulty maintaining attention or concent ration; difficulty understanding or remembering detailed instructions; difficulty in seeing or hearing; difficulty tolerating some physical feature(s) of certa in work settings (e.g., can't tolerate dust or fumes); or

difficulty performing the manipulative or possural functions of some work such as reaching, handling, stooping, climbin g, crawlin g, or crouchin g. 20 CF R 416.969a(c)(1)(i) – (vi). If the impairment(s) and related symptoms, such as pain, only affect the ability to perform the non-exertional aspects of work-related activities, the rules in Appendix 2 do not direct factual conclusions of disabled or not disabled. 20 CFR 416.969a(c)(2). The determination of whether disability exists is based upon the principles in the appropriate sections of the regulations, giving consideration to the rules for specific case situations in Appendix 2. *Id.*

Claimant's prior work history consists of work as a truck driver. In light of Cla imant's testimony, and in considerati on of the Occupationa I Code, Claimant's prior work is classified as semi-skilled, medium work.

Claimant testified that he is able to walk short distances and can lift/carry approximately 2 pounds and can stand for 5 minutes and sit for an hour at a time. If the impairment or combination of impairments does not limit an individual's physical or mental ability to do basic work activities, it is not a s evere impairment(s) and dis ability does not exist. 20 CFR 416.920. In considerat ion of Claimant's testimony, medical records, and current limitations, it is found that Claimant is unable to return to past relevant work.

In Step 5, an assessment of the individua I's residual functional capacity and age, education, and work experience is consider ed to determine whet her an adjustment to other work can be m ade. 20 CFR 416.920(4)(v) At the time of hear ing, the Claimant was 46 years old and was, thus, consider ed to be a younger individual for MA-Ρ purposes. Claimant has a high sc hool education. Disability is found if an individual is unable to adjust to other work. *Id.* At this point in the analysis, the burden shifts from proof that the Claimant has the residual the Claimant to the Department to present capacity to substantial gainful employment. 20 CFR 416.960(2); Richardson v Sec of Health and Human Services, 735 F2d 962, 964 (CA 6, 1984). While a vocational expert is not required, a finding supported by subs tantial evidence that the individual has the vocational gualifications to perform specif ic jobs is needed to meet the burde n. O'Banner v Sec of Health and Human Services , 587 F2d 321, 323 (CA 6, 1978). Medical-Vocational guidelines found at 20 CFR Subpart P, Appendix II, may be used to satisfy the burden of proving that the individual can perform specific jobs in the nation al economy. Heckler v Campbell, 461 US 458, 467 (1983); Kirk v Secretary, 667 F2d 524, 529 (CA 6, 1981) cert den 461 US 957 (1983). The age for younger individuals (under 50) generally will not serious ly affect the ability to adjust to other work. 20 CF R 416.963(c). Where an individual has an impairment or combination of impairments that results in both strength limit ations and non-exertional limitations, the rules in Subpart P are considered in determining whether a finding of disabled may be possible based on the strength limitations alone, and if not, the rule(s) re flecting the individual's maximum residual st rength capabilities, age, educ ation, and work experience, provide the framework for consideration of how much an individual's wor k capabilit y is further diminished in terms of any type of jobs that would contradict the non-limitations. Full consideration must be given to all releva nt facts of a case in accordance with the definitions of each factor to provide adjudicative weight for each factor.

In this case, the evidence reveals that Cla imant suffers from degenerative disc disease, Aspergers, depression, anxiet y and obsessive-compulsive di sorder. The objective medical evidence lists no limitations. In light of the foregoing, it is found that Claimant maintains the residual functional capacity for work activities on a regular and continuin g basis which includes the abilit y to meet the physical and mental demands required t o perform at least light work as defined in 20 CF R 416.967(b). After re view of the entire record using the Medical-Vocational Guide lines [20 CFR 404, S ubpart P, Appendix I I] as a guide, specifically Rule 202.21 , it is found that Claim ant is not disabled for purposes of the MA-P program at Step 5.

DECISION AND ORDER

The Administrative Law Judge, based on the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, finds the Claim ant not disabled for purposes of the MA-P, Retro-MA and SDA benefit programs. Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

The Department's determination is AFFIRMED.

<u>/s/</u>

Vicki L. Armstrong Administrative Law Judge for Maura D. Corrigan, Director Department of Human Services

Date Signed: <u>September 21, 2012</u> Date Mailed: <u>September 21, 2012</u>

NOTICE: Administrative Hearings may or der a rehearing or reconsideration on either its own motion or at t he request of a party within 30 days of the mailing date of this Decision and Order. Administrative Hear ings will not orde r a rehearing or reconsideration on the Department's mo tion where the final decis ion cannot be implemented within 90 days of the filing of the original request.

The Claimant may appeal the Decision and Order to Circuit Court within 30 days of the mailing of the Decision and Order or, if a timely request for rehearing was made, within 30 days of the receipt date of the rehearing decision.

VLA/las

CC: