### STATE OF MICHIGAN STATE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS AND RULES ADMINISTRATIVE HEARINGS FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES

IN THE MATTER	OF:	
C/O		

Reg. No: 2009-32706 Issue No: 2021 Case No: Load No: Hearing Date: April 29, 2010 Ingham County DHS

# ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE: Landis Y. Lain

### **HEARING DECISION**

This matter is before the undersigned Admini strative Law Judge pursuant to MCL 400.9 and MCL 400.37 upon claimant's request for a hearing. After due notic e, a telephone hearing was held on April 29, 2010. Claimant was represented at the hearing by

#### **ISSUE**

Did the Department of Human Services (the department) properly deny claimant's application for Medical Ass istance (MA) bas ed upon its determination t hat claimant possessed excess countable available assets?

### FINDINGS OF FACT

The Administrative Law Judge, based upon the competent, material and substantial evidence on the whole record, finds as material fact:

- (1) On February 27, 2009, the department received a partial application for MA for claimant in the Ingham County office.
- (2) On March 27, 2009, the department received a completed application for claimant and an asset declaration. A completed IAA for January 16, 2009, for the second had a total of second including a homestead in which claimant and his wife had placed in a revocable trust dated October 14, 1999.
- A quitclaim dead submitted transferring the home to claimant from the trust was dated February 24, 2009, (Claimant Attachment #1)

- (4) On **Constant of** claimant pas sed away. Public rec ords still s how the home to be in the trust as of 7/15/09.
- (5) On April 28, 2009, claimant's attorney indicated that the quitclaim is not registered and there was no requirement to register the quitclaim deed.
- (6) On May 14, 2009, the trust was evaluated and per evaluation the homestead was counted as an asset because the quitclaim deed was not registered; the homestead remained in the trust.
- (7) On May 26, 2009, the department iss ued a policy statement indicting that the homestead is considered still in the trust if the quit claim was not registered.
- (8) On May 30, 2009, the application was denied stating that the group was not asset eligible. Appropriate notice was s ent to claimant's representative.
- (9) On June 23, 2009, public records still show the home to be in the trust. On May 30, 2009, the department casewo rker sent claimant and his representative notice t hat the application was denied based upon excess assets.
- (1) On June 2, 2009, claimant filed a request for a hearing to con test the department's negative action.

### CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Medical Assistance (MA) program is estab lished by Title XIX of the Social Sec urity Act and is implemented by T itle 42 of the C ode of Federal Regulations (CFR). The Department of Human Services (DHS or department) administers the MA program pursuant to MCL 400.10, *et seq.*, and MCL 400.105. Department policies are found in the Program Administ rative Manual (PAM), the Program Eligibili ty Manual (BEM) and the Program Reference Manual (PRM).

In the instant case, claimant disputes t he Department's decis ion to request a polic y clarification and its determination that the homestead was considered a part of the trust and therefore a countable, available asset. The claimant provided the department with a copy of the trust which was r evocable. The trust listed claimant and his wife a s Trustees. The homestead was listed as a tr ust property. The original homestead Quitclaim deed was properly recorded with t he Ingham County Register of Deeds in 2002. (Client's Attachment #2 page 4 of 5) The second Quitclaim Deed, which was not recorded, purports to transfer the homest ead from the trust to claimant's wif e. (Claimant's Attachment #2 page 5 of 5)

Title XIX of the Soc ial Securit y Act, co mmonly referred to as "The Medicaid Act," provides for medical assist ance services to individuals <u>who lack the financial means</u> to obtain needed health care. 42 U.S.C. §1396. (Emphasis added)

The Medicaid program is administered by the federal government through the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services (CMS) of the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). The state and federal gove rnments share financial responsibility for Medicaid services. Each state may choose whet her or not to participate in the Medicaid program. Once a state chooses to participate, it must operat e its Medicaid program in accordance with mandatory feder al requirements, i mposed bot h by the Medicaid Act and by im plementing federal regulations authorized under the Medicaid Act and promulgated by HHS.

Participating states must pr ovide at leas t seven categories of medical services to persons determined to be eligible Medic aid recipients. 42 U SC \$1396a(a)(10)(A), 1396d(a)(1)-(5), (17), (21). One of the seven mandated services is *nursing facility services*. 42 USC \$1396d(a)(4)(A).

For medical assistance eligibility, the Department has defined an asset as "any kind of property or property interest, whether real, pe rsonal, or mixed, whether liquid or illiquid, and whether or not presently vested with po ssessory rights." NDAC 75-02- 02.1-01(3). Under both federal and state law, an asset mu st be "actually av ailable" to an applicant to be considered a countable asset for dete rmining medical assistanc e eligibility. Hecker, 527 N.W.2d at 237 (On Petition for Rehearing); Hinschberger v. Griggs County Social Ser v., 499 N.W.2d 876, 882 (N.D.1993) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(17)(B) ; 1 J. Krauskopf, R. Brown, K. Tokarz, and A. Bogutz, Elderlaw: Advocacy for the Agin g § 11.25 (2d ed. 1993). Yet, "actually available" resources "a re different from those in hand." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 48, 101 S.Ct. 2633, 2642, 69 L.Ed.2d 460 (1981) (emphasis in original). NDAC 75-02-02. 1-25(2) explains: Only s uch assets as are actually available will be considered. Assets ar e actually available when at the disposal of an applicant, recipient, or responsible relative; when the applicant, recipient, or responsible relative has a legal interest in a liquidated sum and has the legal ability to make the sum available for support, main tenance, or medical care; or when the applicant, recipient, or responsible relative has the lawful power to make the asset available, or to cause the asset to be made available. A ssets will be reasonably evaluated.... See also45 C.F.R. § 233.20(a)(3)(ii)(D).

As noted in *Hecker*, if an applicant has a legal ability to obtain an asset, it is considered an "actually available" resource. The actual-a vailability principle primarily serves "to prevent the States from conjuring fictional sources of income and resources by imputing financial s upport from persons who have no obligation to furnish it or by overvaluing assets in a manner that attributes non-existent resources to recipients." <u>Heckler v.</u> <u>Turner, 470 U.S. 184, 200, 105 S.Ct. 1138, 1147, 84 L.Ed.2d 138 (1985)</u>.

The focus is on an applicant's actual and practica I ability to make an asset available a s a matter of fact, not legal fiction. See <u>Schrader v. Idaho Dept. of Health and Welfare</u>,

<u>768 F.2d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir.1985)</u>. See also <u>Lewis v. Martin, 397 U.S. 552, 90 S.Ct.</u> <u>1282, 25 L.Ed.2d 561 (1970)</u> (invalidating California st ate regulation that presumed contribution of non- AFDC resources by a non-legally responsible and non-adoptive stepfather or common law husband of an AFDC recipient's mother).

Determining whether an asset is "actually available" for purposes of medical assistance eligibility is largely a fact-specific inquiry depending on the circum stances of each case. See, e.g., <u>Intermountain Health Care v. Bd. of Cty. Com 'rs</u>, 107 Idaho 248, 688 P.2d 260, 264 (Ct.App.1984); <u>Radano v. Blum</u>, 89 A.D.2d 858, 453 N.Y.S.2d 38, 39 (1982) ; <u>Haynes v. Dept. of Hum an Resources</u>, 121 N.C.App. 513, 470 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1996). Interpretation of the "actually av ailable" requirement must be "reasonable and humane in accordance with its mani fest intent and purpose…" <u>Moffett v. Blum</u>, 74 A.D.2d 625, 424 N.Y.S.2d 923, 925 (1980).

That an applicant must sue to collect an a sset the applicant has a legal entitlement to usually does not mean the asset is actually unavailable. See, e.g., <u>Wagner v. Sheridan</u> <u>County S.S. Bd., 518 N.W.2d 724, 728 (N.D.1994)</u>; <u>Frerks v. Shalala, 52 F.3d 412, 414</u> (2d Cir.1995); Probate of Marcus, 199 Conn. 524, 509 A. 2d 1, 5 (1986); <u>Herman v.</u> <u>Ramsey Cty. Community Human Serv., 373 N.W.2d 34 5, 348 (Minn.Ct.App.1985)</u>. See also <u>Ziegler v. Dept. of Health & Rehab. Serv., 601 So.2d 1280, 1284 (Fla.Ct.App.1992)</u> At issue here is the methodology utilized in determining the availability of an individual's "resources" for purposes of eval uating his or her eligibility. SSI recipients, and thus SSI-related "medically needy" recipients, may not retain resources having a value in excess of \$2,000. <u>42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(1)(B)</u>.

The regulations governing the determinat ion of eligibility provide that resources mean cash or other liquid asset s or any real or pers onal property that an individual (or spouse, if any) owns and c ould convert to cash to be used for his sup port and maintenance. If the indiv idual has t he righ t, authority or power to liquidate the property, or his share of the property, it is considered a resource. If a property right cannot be liquidated, the property will not be considered a re source of the individual (or spouse).20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a).

Under BEM, Item 400, an e ligible Medic al Assistance recipient may not possess in excess of \$2000 in assets. In the present case, claimant and his wife received the deed in a revocable trust. Since the homestead was listed in the trust, the claimant provided inconsistent and contradictory information. There is no trust revocation documen t available.

The department determined that the home was a countable as set until the deed was filed with the county register of deeds.

Under BEM, Item 400, an e ligible Medic al Assistance recipient may not possess in excess of \$2000 in assets. In the present case, claimant and his wife placed their homestead in a revocable trust in 1999. Claim ant's representative indic ates that the homestead was transferred solely to the wife from the trust on February 24, 2009. The

department determined that the home was a countable asset until the deed was filed with the county register of deeds. Pertinent Department Policy in BEM, Item 400 page one indic ates that As sets must be cons idered in determining eligibi lity for FIP, SDA, RAPC, LIF, Group 2 P ersons Under Age 21 (G 2U), Group 2 Caretaker Relative (G2C), SSI-related MA categories and AMP.

FIP, SDA, RAPC, LIF, G2U, G2C and AMP consider only the following types of assets:

- . Cash (which includes savings and checking accounts).
- . Investments.
- . Retirement Plans.
- . Trusts.

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**Assets** means cash, any other personal property and real property. **Real property** is land and objects affixed to the land such as buildings, trees and fences. Condominiums are real property. **Personal property** is any item subject to ownership that is **not** real property (examples: currency, savings accounts and vehicles). BEM, Item 400, page 1. Countable assets **cannot** exceed the applicable asset limit. Not all assets ar e counted. An asset is countable if it meet s the availability tests and is **not** excluded. Available means that someone in the asset t group has the right to use or dispose of the asset. BEM, Item 400, page 5. All types of assets are considered for SSI-related MA. BEM, Item 400, page 2. F or Medicare Savings Pr ograms (BEM 165) and QDWI (BEM 169) the asset limit is:

- \$4,000 for an asset group of one.
- . \$6,000 for an asset group of two.

For all other SSI-related MA categories, the asset limit is:

- \$2,000 for an asset group of one.
- . \$3,000 for an asset group of two. BEM, Item 400, page 5.

# HOMES AND REAL PROPERTY EXCLUSIONS

### Homestead Definition and Exclusion

# SSI-Related MA Only

A homestead is where a person lives (unle ss **"Absent from Homestead"**) that he owns, is buyi ng or holds through a life estate or life lease. It incl udes the home, all adjoining land and any other buildings on the I and. Adjoining land means land which is **not** completely s eparated from the home by land owned by someone else. Adjoining land may be separated by rivers, easement s and public rights-of-way (example: utility lines and roads).

Exclude the asset group's homestead. Exclude only one homestead for an asset group. BEM, ITEM 400, page 20.

### SSI-Related MA Only

Exclude a homestead that an owner formerly lived in if **any** of the following are true:

- . The owner intends to return to the homestead.
- . The owner is in an LTC facility, a hospital, an adult foster care (AFC) home or a home for the aged.
- A co-owner of the homestead uses the property as his home. BEM, Item 400, pp. 19-20.

**Relative Occupied**. Exclude a homes tead even if the owner never lived there, provided:

- the owner is in an institution (see PRM, Glossary), and
- the owner's spouse or relative (see below) lives there. BEM, Item 400, pp. 19-20.

Relative for this purpose means a person dependent in any way (financial, medical, etc.) on the owner and related to the owner as any of the following:

- . Child, stepchild or grandchild
- . Parent, stepparent or grandparent
- . Aunt, uncle, niece or nephew
- . Cousin
- . In-law

Brother, sister, stepbrother, steps ister, half brother or half sister. BEM, Item 400, pp. 19-20

In the instant case, the claimant provided the department with a copy of the trust which was revocable. The homestead was listed as a trust property. The Quitclaim Deed purporting to transfer the homestead from the trust was not filed with the Count y Register of Deeds.

The County Register of Deeds records indica te that the property was transferred to There was no updated deed registered nor any deed registered which indic ated that the propert y had been transfe rred to claim ant's spouse. The claim ant's representative provided inc onsistent information, which is surely a justification for the Department Specialist to request a Polic y Clarification. T wo deeds, one filed and one unfiled c ertainly creates an air of uncertainty. Therefore, the department properly denied clai mant's application for Medi cal As sistance based upon it's determination that claimant possessed an excess of \$ assets. The department was unable to determine which of the deeds was the valid one and would therefore have been unable to determine which of the deeds was valid . Michigan Compiled Laws Section 565. 3 states that:

A deed of quit claim and releas e, of the form in common use, shall be sufficient to pass all the estate which the grantor could lawfully convey by a deed of bargain and sale.

Michigan Compiled Laws Section 565.8 states:

Deeds executed wit hin this s tate of lands , or any interest in lands, shall be acknowledged before any judge, cl erk of a court of record, or notary public within this state. The officer taking the acknowledgment shall endorse on the deed a certificate of the acknowledgment, and the true date of taking the acknowledgment, under his or her hand. Any deed that was acknowledged before any county clerk or clerk of any circuit 1903, and t he acknowledgm ent of the deed, and, court. before September 18. if recorded, the record of the deed, shall be as valid for all purposes so far as the acknowledgment and record are concerned, as if the deed had been ack nowledged before any other officer named in this section, and the legality of the acknowledgment and record shall not be questioned in any c ourt or place. If a de ed has been recorded that lacks 1 or more witnesses and the deed has been of record for a period of 10 years or more, and is other wise eligible to record, the record of the deed shall be effectual for all purposes of a legal record and the record of the deed or a tran script of the record may be given in evidence in all cases and the deed shall be as valid and effectual as if it had been duly executed in compliance with this section. (Emphasis added)

The following prove ownership and/or value of assets:

<u>Deed</u>, mortgage, personal agreement or cont ract, state equalized value on curren t property tax records when suppli ed by the attorney and court workers, county records, statement of real estate agent or financial institution. BEM, Item 400, p. 36

Thus, the attempt to remove the homestead from the trus t without properly filing the document with the County Register of Deeds or rev oking the trust provision is an attempt to make the homestead an exempt a sset to claimant. This can only be viewe d as an attempt to circumvent the Medicaid la ws and allow claimant's potential heirs to retain the assets instead of pay ing for his long term care as is appropriate under the circumstances. Allen v. Wessman, 542 N.W.2d 748, 753 (N.D. 1996) ("Public policy will not allow the social s afety net for persons who are old, poor, and unfortunate to b е exploited by those who are affluent."); Meyer v. S.D. Dep't. of Soc. S ervices, 581 N.W.2d 151, 156-58 (S.D. 1998); see also Johnson v. Guhl, 166 F. Supp. 2d 42, 51 (D.N.J. 2001) ("HCFA's position does not frus trate Congress' intent in enacting the MCCA to enable the community spouse t o live above the poverty level. Instead, it ensures that Medicaid, as it was intended, helps the truly needy and f urthers the legislature's intent to 'require couples to bear a reas onable amount of the costs of institutionalized care and thus preserve Medicaid resources."). (Emphasis added)

In the instant case, there are two deeds Register of Deeds. The second is unregis representative provided to t he department is theref ore inconsistent and contradictory. The department is allowed to verify inconsistent or questionable information. Verification means documentation or other evidence to est ablish the accuracy of the client's verbal or written statements.

Obtain verification when:

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- Required by policy. BEM it ems specify which factors and under what circumstances verification is required. Required as a local office option. The requirement must be applied the s ame for every client. Local requirements may not be imposed for MA, TMA-Plus or
- AMP. Information regarding an elig ibility factor is unc lear, inconsistent, incomplete or contradictory. The questionable information might be from the client or a third party.

Verification is **not** required:

- . When the client is clearly ineligible, or
- . For excluded income and assets unless needed to establish the exclusion. BEM, Item 130, page 1.

For verification purposes the Department is required to allow the client 10 calendar days (or other time limit specified in policy) to provide the verification. If the client cannot provide the verification despite a reasonable effort, extend the time limit up to three times. Verifications are considered to be timely if received by the date they are due. For electronically transmitted verifications (fax, email), the date of the transmission is the receipt date. Verifications that are submitted after the close of regular business hours through the drop box or by delivery of a DHS representative are considered to be received the next business day. Send a case action notice when:

- The client indicates refusal to provide a verification, or
- The time period given has elapsed.

**Only adequate** notice is required for an application denial. **Timely** notice is required to reduce or terminate benefits. BEM, Item 130, page 5.

In the instant case, the information prov ided by claimant's representative was contradictory. The Departm ent was unable to make an acc urate assessment of claimant's assets under t he circumstances. If the Homestead remained in the trust claimant would have had in ex cess of \$2,000.00 in countable available assets. Even if the Homes tead had been removed fr om the trust the client might have had excess assets. The determining factor in the instant case is that the Department was unable to

determine which deed controls and claimant's representative failed to provide sufficient evidence that second unrecorded deed supersedes the prior properly recorded deed.

The Department afforded claimant's represent ative ample time to provide verification information in the form of a recorded de ed which would hav e established that the homestead belonged to claimant's wife and not to the trust. The claimant' s representative did not provide the verification information. Theref ore, the Department has established by the necessary competent, material and substantial evidence on the record that it was acting in compliance with Department policy when it denied claimant's application for Medical Assistance benefits under the circumstances.

### DECISION AND ORDER

The Administrative Law Judge, based upon t he above findings of fact and conclusion s of law, decides that the cl aimant provided the department with inconsistent information. The trust document indicates that the homest ead was a part of the tr ust property. The quitclaim deed provided by the cl aimant's attorney indicates that claimant quitclaimed the property to his wife, but that deed was never filed wit h the register of deed. Therefore, there is no indication that the trust was ac tually revoked and the homestead removed from the trust. The representativ e provided inconsist ent and contradictory evidence and the department was unable to accurately determine claimant's assets.

Accordingly, the department's decision is **AFFIRMED**. This Administrative Law Judge finds that claimant possessed in excess of **Sectors** in countable available as sets on the date of application or in the alternative that the asset level was indeterminable because of the contradictory information provided to the Department.

Landis Y. Lain Administrative Law Judge for Ismael Ahmed, Director Department of Human Services

Date Signed: <u>July 1, 2010</u>

Date Mailed: July 2, 2010

**NOTICE:** Administrative Hearings may or der a rehearing or reconsideration on either its own motion or at t he request of a party wit hin 30 days of the ma iling date of this Decision and Order. Administrative Hear ings will not orde r a rehearing or

reconsideration on the Department's mo tion where the final decis ion cannot be implemented within 90 days of the filing of the original request.

The Claimant may appeal the Decision and Order to Circuit Court within 30 days of the mailing of the Decision and Order or, if a timely request for rehearing was made, within 30 days of the receipt date of the rehearing decision.

LYL/alc

